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ABSTRACT 
 
 
In this dissertation I introduce an institutional approach for the research of the Chinese 
welfare state and the measure of people’s welfare benefit. I demonstrate that multiple 
institutional transitions due to the economic reforms initiated in the early 1980s have 
since dramatically changed the Chinese welfare state and the way welfare benefits are 
distributed. Multiple institutional transitions discussed in this dissertation are structural 
changes associated with the state-owned enterprise (SOE) reforms, the rapid 
industrialization, ever-growing urbanization, and large-scale decentralization of the fiscal 
system. Through the exploration of the data from the 1988 and 1995 Chinese Household 
Income Project (CHIP), I found that SOE reforms and the fiscal decentralization played a 
significant role in the cutback of welfare benefit in the reform era. Employees in non-
state sectors and drawing welfare benefits from local welfare funds are more likely to 
receive less welfare benefits from the state or the work unit than those people employed 
in the state sector and drawing welfare benefits from state funds. The other two 
institutional changes, namely industrialization and urbanization, are not statistically 
significant.  
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
 
This is a study about institutional change and the Chinese welfare state. By 
‘institutional change’ I mean China’s transitions from a centrally planned economy to a 
market economy, from a socialist system to a mixed entity of socialism and capitalism, 
and from a traditional society to a modern industrial society. By ‘the Chinese welfare 
state’ I am not referring to a welfare state such as those found in western nations, but 
rather the system in place in China which provides both social security and social relief in 
various forms to Chinese citizens. A widely accepted proposition about the Chinese 
welfare state is that the market transition initiated in the early 1980s has changed the way 
Chinese people receive their welfare benefits (Wong 1992, Liu 2002). The purpose of my 
dissertation is to examine China’s welfare system in the context of transition since the 
Communist takeover in 1949. My preliminary study indicates that the research of market 
transition and economic performance is an effective way of understanding the nature of 
the Chinese social policy (Li 2004). As Douglass North (1994) proposed, economic 
performance can be better understood by considering institutional change over time. The 
role of institutions and institutional change has received extensive attention in the study 
of the welfare state (Ashford 1987:1-29). For example, Gøsta Esping-Andersen (1990: 1-
5) points out that the ideal method for studying the welfare state is interpreting 
institutional settings in a particular state. The effort of examining the Chinese welfare 
state in the context of transition has the potential of shedding new light on the affects of 
its social implications. 
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1. China’s Multiple Transitions and Welfare 
China has undergone three simultaneous transitions since the establishment of the 
Communist regime in 1949. In the past few decades, these transitions have radically 
altered China’s welfare state policies which in turn have affected people’s well-being 
enormously. The theory of multi-transitions is useful in explaining the dynamic 
characteristics of Chinese society. The first transition in this theory is social transition. 
Upon assuming power in China, the Communist regime abandoned many traditional 
Chinese values and replaced them with the socialist ideology. This socialist ideology 
originally borrowed from the former Soviet Union then mixed with traditional Chinese 
values and Western welfare state principles in the economic reform era in the 1980s. The 
second transition is institutional. As the centrally planned economy has been gradually 
replaced by a market economy, the Chinese polity has become more fragmented. Local 
governments and the civil society have gained more freedom from the central authority. 
The third transition is the market or economic transition. The private sector has 
proliferated due to the policy of building a market-oriented economy. Free-market 
mechanisms continue to play an increasing role in pricing, resource distribution, and 
economic development. 
In this dissertation, the Chinese welfare state will be discussed in the context of 
China’s multi-transitions. The above-mentioned transitions are obvious when we divide 
the Chinese industrial and economic development into pre-reform and reform phases with 
the imposition of the market mechanism in the early 1980s as the partition. Three major 
stages are enclosed in the pre-reform phase. The socialist transformation started 
immediately after the establishment of Communist China in 1949 and ended in 1956 
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when the Chinese government claimed that the socialist economic system had 
rudimentally been established. In the second stage, from 1957 to 1965, China stepped 
into the socialist construction and consolidation period during which the socialist 
economy witnessed industrial stagnation and decreased agricultural output due to the 
Great Leap Forward (GLF). The third stage comprises the Great Proletarian Culture 
Revolution (GPCR) years from 1966 to 1976 and the recovering years immediate after its 
termination. The reform phase began in 1980 as China began the installation of a market 
economy. This phase can also be partitioned into three stages. The first stage includes the 
initiative years of the rural reform from 1980 to 1984. Many policies aimed at 
encouraging people’s productivity and institutional flexibility were introduced in this 
stage. Among these policies, the most significant institutional innovation was the 
introduction of the Household Productive Responsibility System (HPRS) and the market 
mechanism.  
The second stage started in 1984 and roughly ended in 1997. The market reform 
initiated in rural areas was extended into urban areas and state-owned enterprises (SOEs). 
The market mechanism was widely applied in commercial and industrial sectors. Price 
reforms were completed in the early 1990s. At this time the two-tier price system 
practiced in the 1980s was revoked. Managers in SOEs received more autonomy in 
determining production levels and pricing. In return they were also given full 
responsibility for making profits and providing benefits to employees. Governments at 
every level were required to undertake market transitions in their respective districts. In 
1987 the Contract Responsibility System (CRS) was introduced to all SOEs. Under this 
system, the market force replaced the administrative command in managing personnel of 
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SOEs. The third stage started in 1997 as the Chinese government loosened the ownership 
regulation of SOEs. General Secretary Jiang Zemin announced in a report on the 
Fifteenth Communist Party Congress that SOEs should be restructured through 
shareholding reform which would allow the privatization of state property.  
In the pre-reform phase, China’s first social security program the Labor Insurance 
Regulations (LIRs) was introduced in 1951 (Liu 2002). Urban residents, mostly 
employees in state sectors and government officials, were covered by comprehensive 
social security schemes. Welfare benefits provided through the LIR included old-age and 
disability pensions, health care and medical insurance, industrial injury insurance, 
sickness benefits, and maternity benefits for female employees. Employees in non-state 
sectors and self-employed urban residents were not covered by the LIRs. Urban self-
employed people were given social relief and a variety of allowances. In rural areas, 
every rural household was assigned a piece of land. Rural people were eligible for 
receiving collective welfare benefits provided by local governments or communal 
organizations (Chan and Chow 1992). China’s welfare provision in this period was 
generous and comprehensive. The exclusion of unemployment benefits was probably the 
most significant character that differentiated the Chinese welfare state with established 
Western welfare states. Employees in state enterprises and public organizations were 
covered by pensions and health insurances. The costs of these schemes were completely 
shouldered by the state and SOEs since according to the socialism ideology workers are 
masters of the state (Dixon 1981, Chan 1992). Full employment was guaranteed for urban 
working-age population. Workers in private or collective enterprises were also entitled to 
access to comprehensive social welfare benefits with the cost completely borne by 
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employers. Rural people enrolled in People’s Communes were given access to basic 
health care with the costs paid by the Commune or the respective collective organization. 
Rural residents with disabilities were put under the care of collective organizations. The 
Five Guarantees system stipulated that aged, disabled, and minors meeting certain 
conditions in rural areas could enjoy “five guarantees” including food, clothing, housing, 
Medicare, and burial expenses (and also stipulated compulsory education for minors).  
In the reform phase, however, many urban working-age people were laid off due 
to ownership changes and state enterprise reforms. As a result, many work-based welfare 
benefits were cut off because their work units were unable to continue the payment of the 
premium. Rural people were deprived of welfare benefits installed since the early 1950s. 
Due to the collapse of the People’s Commune, almost all rural residents were denied 
access to collective welfare. Welfare benefits of both urban and rural residents have been 
shrinking compared to those of pre-reform periods. Since the late 1990s, the new 
generation of the Chinese leaders has become aware of the social security program’s 
insufficiency. The building of a new social security program is now a major concern for 
the top bureaucrats. The latest slogan of the Chinese reform-minded leaders is to 
construct a harmonious society in which the social security program plays a crucial role. 
In recent years, welfare benefits have gradually been restored for urban residents. A 
western welfare state in the institutional sense is emerging in Chinese society. 
This dissertation will examine China’s effort of rebuilding its welfare system 
which in the past two decades has been almost completely destroyed due to the economic 
transition (Chen 1996, 1998, 2002, 2003, Wong 1998: 7, World Bank 2005). Studies 
indicate that during the market transition Chinese leaders have been too concerned with 
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economic growth while ignoring the growing social problems (Rawski 1995, Wong and 
Lee 2001). Recent nationwide crises such as the outburst of the Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome (SARS), massive appealing activities of floating peasant workers (mingong), 
and demonstrations of the state enterprises’ laid-off workers have testified that economic 
growth alone cannot empower the Communist regime (O’Brien and Li 1995, Li and 
O’Brien 1996, Cai 2002). The declining investment in social welfare and social security 
has intensified the widening social gaps. The isolation of the ruling party from the masses 
has generated panic among the Chinese leaders. They believe that current social tensions 
might be countervailed by bringing the welfare state plans to the top of the national 
agenda.  
 
2. The Research Purposes and Possible Findings 
In this study, the definition of the Chinese welfare state is much more general. 
Chinese society has been in the middle of a series of transformations since the market 
reforms were launched in the early 1980s. Social provisions in the pre-reform and the 
reform eras are widely divergent. Typical welfare programs in Chinese society include 
measures of both the welfare state I (welfare as social rights based on the citizenship) and 
the welfare state II (welfare as benefits to the deserved social groups, usually means-
tested). The Chinese welfare state is now a mixed entity with a socialist ideology ceding 
its dominancy to the Western welfare state which is institutionally more suitable to the 
current market-oriented economic regime.  
Welfare programs to be discussed in this dissertation are schemes of social 
security and social relief. China’s social security schemes include primarily old-age 
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pensions and health care insurances and services received by urban residents. These are 
the major social security schemes which construct the core of the Chinese welfare state. 
Esping-Andersen (1990: 79-80) argued that the analysis of pension provides a good 
account of the welfare state. However, most Chinese rural residents do not have a 
pension. The study of health care plans, therefore, will explain the welfare situation of the 
rural population. Housing is another major welfare program prevailed in urban areas. It 
will also be discussed in this study. Health insurance schemes and services usually 
enclose more population than pension schemes do. Social security schemes receive the 
lion share of the government expenditure. However conspicuous the social security 
schemes might be in consuming the government revenue, means-tested and poor-relief 
programs are not to be ignored. Social relief programs in Chinese society include 
remedial schemes for the poor or handicapped, and welfare services for needy citizens. 
Welfare services, as Chan and Chow (1992: 32-33) point out, are provided by the Civil 
Affairs Department (CAD) and some other non-governmental organizations (NGOs). 
Rural residents are usually the main receivers of social relief allowances.  
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the impacts of China’s multi-transitions 
on its welfare state. Historical review and analysis of the government expenditure on a 
variety of welfare programs will be presented. Empirical evidences from surveys are used 
to support findings from the documentary reviewing and analyzing. Targeted welfare 
schemes are the social security (pensions, health care, etc.), work-related allowances and 
subsidies, and social relief programs. The social relief spending Chinese society is the 
means-tested social allowance for needy people. Since the coverage of social security 
schemes is mostly work-based and exclusively available to urban residents, social relief 
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programs bear the responsibility of obliging disadvantaged social groups who rarely 
receive any occupational benefits. Social security and social relief schemes serve the 
interests of different social groups and therefore are designed to meet various social 
missions. A decent discussion of the Chinese welfare state is impossible without 
addressing both of them. Work-related allowances and subsidies are important welfare 
benefits available exclusively to urban population. These benefits include housing 
allowances, medical subsidies, child care subsidies, and regional subsidies for people 
working in economic backward or under hazardous environment. 
I argue in this dissertation that institutional changes associated with economic 
growth are a crucial factor in predicting the outcomes of China’s welfare policies. The 
Chinese welfare state can be best understood by investigating the pattern of social and 
economic transitions. China’s centrally planned economy has experienced market and 
institutional transitions. During these transitions, many welfare state programs organized 
or sponsored by the government are gradually abandoned or reduced due to financial 
insufficiency or organizational failure. These transitions are both unique and complex and 
the effort of building a welfare state has become a most recent political goal of the 
governing authority. In a speech recently made by Hu Jintao, current President of the 
People’s Republic of China, the country’s new political goal was to construct a 
harmonious society (People’s Daily Oct. 20 2006). In 2004 the government amended its 
nationwide pension program to cover urban employees in private sectors. The 
unemployment insurance schemes used to cover exclusively employees in state-owned 
and collective enterprises extended their coverage to self-employed urban citizens. Since 
1998, health insurance schemes have begun to enclose both urban and rural residents who 
 9
lost their health care benefits during the market transitions. Social relief programs have 
begun to provide services and cash benefits to poor and handicapped. People who are 
aged, unemployed, sick, or handicapped are now given the access to welfare schemes 
financed by the government. These policy changes are a visible part of the recent agenda 
of rebuilding the welfare state proposed by the new generation of Chinese leaders.  
On a more general basis, my study is relevant to the academic debates on post-
Communist or transitional societies. This study will contribute a new perspective and 
fresh approach to the research of post-Communist or transitional societies. The neoclassic 
approach has been condemned for placing too much emphasis on marketization or 
privatization. Radical transitions—the so-called “shock-therapy” or “cold-turkey” 
approach—observed in Center and Eastern Europe have never taken place in China. This 
approach is thus inadequate when dealing with China’s transitions. In this dissertation I 
will take a neo-institutional approach. Neo-institutionalists advocate that the changing 
property regime and the economic development strategies differentiate China from other 
post-Communist regimes. I extend my research to review China’s historical, cultural, and 
ideological legacies, and examine the impacts they have placed on China’s institutional 
settings. I believe that studying China’s transitions is essential to the understanding of 
China’s social policies. This leads us to discover the nature of the Chinese welfare state. 
This dissertation, therefore, has the potential of shedding new light on the study of the 
welfare state in post-Communist or transitional societies.  
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3. Research Methods and Data Sources 
 I conduct this dissertation by designing a comprehensive research model based 
primarily on statistical methods. The core statistical method used in this dissertation is the 
ordinary least squares method (OLS) developed in Chapter V. The OLS analysis is a 
method for linear regression that determines the values of unknown quantities in a 
statistical model by minimizing the sum of the residuals squared. This method was first 
developed by Carl Friedrich Gauss. I briefly introduce in the following section the 
mathematic measures that support the regression models. 
 The data points are expressed in the following formula with y referring the 
dependent variable and x referring the independent variables. 
 (yi, x1i, x2i, ….., xki) with i = 1, 2, 3, ….., n; k > 2 
 I model this data with a function of the form y = f (x1i, x2i, ….., xki, a), i = 1, 2, 
…., n, where x is the independent variables while a is the model adjustable parameters. I 
wish to find the a values such that the model best fits the data. In the OLS analysis, the 
objective is to minimize the following function 
 )),,...,,(( 21
1
axxxfyS kiii
n
i
i −=∑
=
                                                  Equation 1.1 
 In multiple regression analysis, one replaces the relation f (x1i, x2i, ….., xki, a) ≈ yi 
with f (x1i, x2i, ….., xki, a) = yi + εi  
 The regression model is thus expressed as  
 ikki xxxy εβββα +++++= ...2211  (i =1, 2, …., n; k> 2)          Equation 1.2 
 The model can then be written as  
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              Equation 1.3 
This regression assumes a linear relationship among the dependent variable, 
independent variables, and control variables. The analysis of variance (ANOVA) is used 
to uncover the main and joint effects of categorical independent variables and control 
variables. A ‘main effect’ is the direct effect of an independent variable on the dependent 
variable. A ‘joint effect’ is the effects placed on the dependent variable by two or more 
independent variables when examined in one model. The ANOVA can minimize biases 
created by correlation and test the problems of collinearity.  
The regression analysis developed throughout this dissertation leads to the 
discovery of the impacts that institutional changes have placed on the Chinese welfare 
state and people’s well-being. Descriptive analysis methods are also used to examining 
data drawn from the China Statistical Yearbook 1990, 1999, 2000, 2003, 2004, and 2005.  
The China Statistical Yearbook (CSYB) is an annual statistical publication which 
covers very comprehensive data and some selective data series in historically important 
years. It provides data with rich statistics on people, economy, resources, markets, 
industries, geographic areas and much more. For example, chapters like population, 
investment in fixed assets, government finance, price index, people’s livelihood, 
domestic trade, industry, foreign trade and economic cooperation, and culture, sports, and 
public health will be used to compile my dataset. 
Another statistical source is the China Labor Statistical Yearbook (CLSYB). The 
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CLSYB is an annual statistical publication which comprehensively reports the labor 
economic situation. It covers some main indicators series for historically years at national 
and provincial, autonomous regional and municipal levels and parts of cities and special 
administrative regions. 
  The third statistical source is the China Sanitation (Public Health) Statistical 
Yearbook (CSSYB). The CSSYB provides statistical data of population, public health, 
sanitation organizations, medical organizations, non-profit health organizations, 
hospitals, communal health centers and much more. 
 The regression analyses and the models developed in Chapter V are based on two 
survey data sources. The first one is the 1988 Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP 
1988). This collection consists of two distinct samples of the urban and rural population 
of the PRC which were selected from significantly large samples (67,186 rural 
households and 34,945 urban households). The second survey data, also a more important 
one, is the 1995 Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP 1995). This collection 
consists of both urban and rural survey results. Approximately 65,000 rural households 
and 35,000 urban households are drawn by the State Statistical Bureau. 
Within each survey dataset, there are separate individual and household data. The 
rural component of this collection consists of two datasets, one in which the individual is 
the unit of analysis and a second in which the household is the unit of analysis. 
Correspondingly, the urban component also consists of two separate datasets, one for 
individuals and another one for households.  
The descriptive analyses of this dissertation use both individual and household 
data. However, the regression analyses and the models developed in Chapter V are 
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completely based on urban individual data from CHIP 1995.  
There are some other data sources used in this dissertation. These data are 
obtained from public libraries or through providers’ websites. They are public data 
sources frequently used by many political science researchers. World Health 
Organization (WHO) Member Countries Data includes data from World Health Statistics 
and The World Health Report on diseases and health achievement for all WHO member 
states. World Bank Development Indicator (WDI) is the World Bank's premier annual 
compilation of data about development. It has been published annually in print and on 
CD-ROM. The data used in this dissertation are from World Bank’s 2001, 2003, and 
2004 collections on CD-ROM. 
 
4. Chapter Outlines 
Four chapters follow this introduction. In Chapter II I review the evolution of 
Western welfare states and the welfare state theories. Definitions of the welfare state are 
discussed and evaluated. Theories of the welfare state are reviewed in terms of their 
relevance to this dissertation. Historical, ideological, and institutional perspectives of the 
Chinese welfare state are summarized. The role of the state in the development of welfare 
state is articulated. Literature on the Chinese welfare state indicates that the government 
played an active role in steering businesses into a market economy. After a comparison of 
the Chinese welfare state and Western welfare states, the research purposes of this 
dissertation are further articulated. 
 Chapter III reviews traditional welfare schemes in pre-republic China. I also 
discuss the fundamental philosophies and cultures underlying the ancient China’s welfare 
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programs. This chapter articulates Communist China’s welfare programs in both urban 
and rural areas. After a brief review of the evolution of China’s welfare system, I further 
discuss the comprehensiveness of the welfare schemes. The historical legacies and 
political impetuses leading to China’s established welfare system are given. The financial 
burdens and institutional fails that finally ruined this comprehensive welfare system are 
discussed. A deliberate comparison of the welfare system in the pre-reform and reform 
eras was given in support of the argument that economic reforms in practice since the 
early 1980s have profoundly changed the Chinese welfare state.  
In Chapter IV I demonstrate the impacts that institutional changes have placed on 
the Chinese welfare state. The Chinese government has played an active role in economic 
development as well as the welfare provision. I discuss the general factors that have 
steered the Chinese welfare state. These general factors are products of the economic 
reforms transforming SOEs in urban areas and People’s Communes in rural areas. 
Specific factors propelling China’s transitions are discussed in detail. The economic 
reforms have brought multiple institutional changes into China. Institutional changes as 
specific factors examined in this dissertation are SOE reforms, the rapid industrialization 
and urbanization of the Chinese state, and the fiscal decentralization in the reform era. 
These institutional changes have influenced the way people receive welfare benefits 
differently.  
 In Chapter V I develop a comprehensive analytical method testing the impacts 
that the institutional changes have placed on the Chinese welfare state and people’s 
welfare benefits. Data from the Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP) 1988 and 
1995 are used in support of my arguments. Results suggest that SOE reforms and the 
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fiscal decentralization have significant estimates while industrialization and urbanization 
are statistically non-significant. This finding confirms the active state argument which 
denies the claim that resource availability and state wealth have played a determinant role 
in the transition of the Chinese welfare state. All models report negative relations 
between the dependent variable Welfare Benefit and the institutional variables, namely 
SOE Reform, Industrialization, Urbanization, and Decentralization. Therefore, 
institutional changes undergoing in both economic and social fields have profoundly 
influenced the well-being of Chinese people.  
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CHAPTER 2: The Welfare State and Welfare State Theories 
 
As a social science concept, the term ‘welfare state’ is both abstract and ambiguous. 
There is no generally accepted definition of the welfare state (Titmuss 1963: 3, 1987: 
141, Veit-Wilson 2000). According to Henry Pelling (1984: 88-90), ‘welfare state’ as a 
term was first used by Alfred Zimmern in the late 1930s to distinguish between the 
policies of the democracies and the war states of Europe’s dictators. With welfare states 
gradually replacing old poor relief systems in the late 19th century, the poor laws1 for 
example, welfare provision in advanced industrial European countries became universal 
(Marshall 1964, Ashford 1987: 10-12, Korpi 1989). Modern welfare states, Douglas E. 
Ashford (1987: 4) argued, developed through a gradual process. Modern welfare states 
differed from previous schemes of poor relief because welfare provisions in these states 
were based on social rights (Burchell 1995, Cox 1998, Kahn 2002).  
 
1. Western Welfare State Theories 
In the pre-War era, the term welfare state was used to describe those states whose 
governments offered “a basic modicum of welfare” (Esping-Andersen 1990: 19). This 
definition however, as Esping-Andersen (1990: 19) puts it, is misleading since it is based 
solely on the expenditure aspect of the welfare state. Social scientists have been criticized 
for being too prone to accepting any “nation’s self-proclaimed welfare-state status” 
(Esping-Andersen 1990: 20). As this approach rarely looks at factors other than the level 
                                                 
1 Poor Laws are the regulations towards poor relief. The most noted poor law system was the social security 
and welfare system in operation in England from the 16th century until the establishment of the Welfare 
State in the 20th century. It was made up of several Acts of Parliament and subsequent Amendments. 
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of social expenditure and commitments made by states, it is an inadequate avenue of 
distinguishing between different types of welfare states. Many other aspects of the 
welfare state are ignored by this definition. For example, a state may spend a significant 
portion of its revenue on welfare but distributes most of it to particular social groups such 
as privileged civil servants. As a result, many recent researchers would not define this 
state as a welfare state (Veit-Wilson 2000).  
Since the 1970s, scholars have emphasized the functional and structural aspect of 
the welfare state (Esping-Andersen 1990: 20, Myles and Quadagno 2002). This approach, 
as Esping-Andersen (1990: 35-47) argued, inherited the theoretical legacy of Adam 
Smith and Karl Polanyi who stressed the de-comodification of workers in a market 
economy. The contemporary definition of the welfare state enables researchers to explore 
comparatively the nature of modern welfare states. Scholars following this definition 
have related the welfare state to the goal of maintaining a minimum standard of life 
(Wilensky 1975, Mishra 1990, Bryson 1992), relief of poverty (Walker 1983, Parry 1985, 
Mishra 1990), full employment (Parry 1985, Mishra 1990), social and economic equality 
and justice (Flora and Heidenheimer 1981, Robertson 1988), deco modification (Fruniss 
and Titon 1979, Esping-Andersen 1987), and the redistributive aspect of the market 
system in welfare provision (Wilensky 1975, Esping-Andersen 1982, Walker 1983). At 
the core of contemporary welfare states lies the doctrine of viewing social rights as 
fundamental human rights (Marshall 1964, Wilensky 1975: 1, Esping-Andersen 1990). 
The universality of modern social security schemes provides citizens with a safety net 
which in turn ameliorates the pure commodity status of workers (Kahn 2002).  
With the welfare state playing an ever-increasing role in people’s lives, scholars 
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examining are now raising theories from different angles. One important perspective of 
the welfare state is that theories intending to explain it do not have a distinguished 
history. Studies about the welfare state have been undertaken primarily by political 
scientists, sociologists, or economists (Therborn 1986: 132-133, Mishra 1987:69). British 
sociologist Thomas Humphrey Marshall (1964) identified the welfare state as a 
distinctive combination of democracy, welfare, and capitalism. The introduction of the 
concept of social rights laid the ground for thereafter studies on welfare states (Korpi 
1989). Welfare provision became an inalienable part of modern government activities. 
Routine welfare schemes in modern welfare states include social insurance for 
unemployment, sickness, injuries, and so on.  
One earliest generation of welfare state studies was the ‘logic of industrialism’ 
approach. Industrialization theorists came up with the assertion that economic 
development caused the modern welfare state. Typical ‘logic of industrialism’ theses 
established the connection between rising welfare state expenditures and the economic 
growth in developed countries (Wilensky and Lebeaux 1958, Kerr et al. 1960, Priyor 
1968, Rimlinger 1971, Wilensky 1975). It is not difficult for many to accept that 
industrialization brought too much misery to the working class. As Karl Polanyi (1957 
[1944]) demonstrated in The Great Transformation, poor laws could not shield workers 
from the increasing commodifing pressure associated with the market economy. 
Industrialization created the modern industrial economy which has destroyed traditional 
values and social institutions (Flora and Alber 1981, Pryor 1968). For people 
impoverished during industrialization, kinship and community became a less reliable 
source of welfare. Therefore the State was anticipated to play a more active and expanded 
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role in welfare provision (Kerr et al. 1960: 22, 152).   
Whereas ‘the logic of industrialism’ theorists stressed the determining role of the 
market force, Structuralist Marxists emphasized changing relations of production (Offe 
1972, O’Connor 1973). The welfare state expansion, James O’Connor (1973) argued, 
was driven by the capitalist mode of production. Structuralist Marxism and its ‘logic of 
industrialism’ counterpart shared a similar functional logic (Giddens 1976: 716-22, 
Gough 1979: 8-9). Welfare states, as both theories asserted, are the inevitable product of 
larger market or economic forces beyond the control of policy makers or class directives 
(Poulantzas 1973, Block 1977, Skocpol and Amenta 1986, Esping-Andersen 1990: 14, 
Myles and Quadagno 2002). The emergence of the welfare state, according to the ‘logic 
of industrialism,’ was the historical result of capitalist economic growth. Structuralist 
Marxists resorted to the capitalist relations of production when interpreting the welfare 
state. For both approaches, the impact of political actors and institutions other than 
markets are not so relevant. Governments are therefore treated as empty-minded 
institutions. 
The institutional approach of interpreting the variation of the welfare state turned 
into policy making and political activity. Walter Korpi (1980, 1983), for example, 
stressed the claim of ‘politics matters’ in arguing the diversity of the welfare state. The 
“power resource” theory gradually received scholars’ acceptance because the interaction 
of capitalism and democracy was found to be crucial to the making of social policy. 
Gerhardt Lenski (1966) argued that democratic polities provided an adequate arena for 
the working class to unite against the elites (the ruling few). The State and government 
were therefore utilized by the masses to construct a welfare state which allotted a large 
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share of the social surplus to social security schemes. The ‘power resource’ theory also 
stresses the importance of organization of the masses (the union), the mobilization of the 
working class, and competitive elections. The relatively generous spending in some states 
could be explained by the relative success of left-wing parties in their governments 
(Korpi 1989, Palme 1990, Kangas 1991). Empirical evidence confirmed to some degree 
the ‘power resource’ theory when scholars designed quantitative methods to test it 
(Cameron 1978, Stephens 1979, Castles 1982, Hicks and Swank 1984, Myles 1984, 
Esping-Andersen 1985). Institutionalists also emphasized the organization and structure 
of state institutions. Theda Skocpol (1992), for example, took a polity-centered approach 
in examining the role of state institutions in the welfare state evolution. Institutional 
settings like the veto points in policy making were believed to have contributed to the 
variation of welfare states. 
The emergence of welfare states has been a gradual phenomenon in developed 
countries. As Esping-Andersen (1990) puts it, there is no such thing that one day every 
one agrees that people need a welfare state. The gradually constructed welfare state is 
both the product of economic growth and the result of institutional settings associated 
with capitalism and democracy. Few will disagree that economic growth has laid the 
ground for modern welfare states by enabling a relatively larger share of surplus to be 
spent on social security schemes. Besides the ‘logic of industrialism’ argument, the 
institutional approach has gained credibility simply because a state’s economic capability 
cannot guarantee the welfare state. In other words, a state might possess the economic 
power to spend on welfare but lack the will to do so. This is evident when we look at the 
United States which has the most powerful economy in the world and weak welfare 
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system. Therefore, as institutionalists argued, examining institutional settings can be an 
adequate avenue of the study of welfare states. 
 
2. The Chinese Welfare State: Traditional and Modern Perspectives 
Traditional systems of relief for the poor prevailed throughout China’s long 
dynastic history (Chow 1987).  Before the Communist regime was established in 1949, 
welfare provision in Chinese society was undertaken by the State in the form of poor 
relief. Although Chinese emperors claimed to be the son of the Heaven and bore the 
responsibility of taking care of their subjects, the State’s role in welfare provision was 
actually very limited (Deng 1986: 226, Meng and Wang 1986: 276-284). Local 
governments provided food and medicine to victims of nature calamity only occasionally. 
Victims of floods, catastrophic nature disasters, or wars were given temporary tax breaks 
as compensation. Social relief programs aimed at the poor or victims of nature calamity 
were usually provided by local wealthy people (xiangshen). Non-government social 
groups such as temples and churches also provided food and medicine to people in these 
situations (Deng 1986: 203).  
According to the Chinese sociologist Fei Xiaotung, the traditional social relief 
system in China was primarily based on kinship networks (Fei 1985). The traditional 
Chinese culture failed to develop the concept of social rights. Chinese traditional social 
relations were based on five basic relationships (wuchang) which stressed an 
interpersonal dependency. Many social relations in traditional China were therefore not 
regulated by law but subject to intense human kindness or personal connection. The 
family was the most important network for providing help in difficult times (Wong 1971, 
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Chow 1987, Chan and Chow 1992: 37). The State or the emperor, on the other hand, was 
perceived by the Chinese as a regulator rather than a protector. People are more prepared 
to seek support from their relatives than turn to the State for help (Dixon 1982). 
The modern Chinese welfare state has a short history when compared to Western 
welfare states. Viewed as a Western idea, the modern welfare state did not come to be 
known in China until the late 1970s when the Communist regime finally ended its 
ideological purge. However, welfare provision by the State was not strange to Chinese 
people well before the Western welfare state ideology was introduced. The Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) had declared before it took over state power that everyone 
should be entitled the equal rights in political as well as in economic areas (Mok 1983, 
Selden and You 1997). The CCP adopted a series of social policies aimed at constructing 
an egalitarian society (Chan and Chow 1992: 9-20). In the early years of the Communist 
regime, the CCP successfully removed the so-called “exploitive class” and redistributed 
productive materials like land and farm cattle to poor people. In the 1950s, China began 
to install a state welfare program (Selden and You 1997). During the inception years of 
the social security schemes a work-based welfare system was established (Chow 1988). 
Welfare benefits like free health care and generous old-age pensions became guaranteed 
benefits to all state sector workers (Liu 2002). Chinese urban residents, particularly those 
working in state-owned enterprises, were entitled to broad social rights in addition to 
privileged political rights (Selden and You 1997).  
However, since the economic reform era, the Chinese people have been gradually 
deprived many work-based welfare benefits. According to the demarcation line drawn by 
Nathan Glazer (1986), a welfare system providing its citizens with as-of-right services 
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and benefits based on universal social rights is called Welfare I while the term Welfare II 
is used to denote the means-tested and remedial system (Glazer 1986, Wong 1987: 2, 
Esping-Andersen 1990: 20). Before the Chinese government announced its ambitious 
social security programs in the late 1990s, many active Chinese welfare schemes could be 
categorized into the residual model or the Welfare II (Chow 1987, Wong 1987: 7, Chen 
1996). Since many people lost their work-based welfare benefits, in recent years the 
budget allotted to social relief programs has been increased (Liu 2002). The current 
Chinese welfare state is a mixed system with the residual model occupying an important 
share (Mok 1987, Wong 1998). Although social security schemes like pension or 
unemployment insurance are routine items received by some Chinese people, their 
coverage up to date is very limited (Liu 2002). The Chinese government puts much effort 
into social relief programs. The major responsibility assigned to the Ministry of Civil 
Affairs, for example, is to help people overcome temporary hardships (Wong 1987: 1). It 
is not surprising that the current Chinese welfare state is compatible to Western welfare 
states in the 1970s. Welfare states of Western industrialized countries have developed 
from a residual model to an institutional-redistributional model since the 1950s 
(Wilensky and Lebeaux 1958). Similarly, in the current Chinese welfare state welfare 
provision is undertaking a transition from playing a supplementary role to being an 
independent and inalienable part of the social system (Chow 1987). The range of social 
welfare services and the coverage of social security schemes have extended to include a 
wide variety of universal benefits designed to promote the well-being of all members of 
society. 
Literature shows that in China few scholars are interested in welfare matters 
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(Wong 1987: 5). Two important factors impede the study of the Chinese welfare state. 
First, the concept of the welfare state is ambiguous. It is well known that many 
methodological tactics introduced in the study of Western welfare states have failed to 
explain the Chinese case (Wong 1998). The reason is straightforward. China is neither a 
capitalist system nor a democratic entity and therefore is not institutionally compatible to 
Western countries. Second, when it comes to empirical tests, China’s statistical resources 
are always suspect or fail to support any concrete conclusion. These two constraints 
determine that studies of the Chinese welfare state are less popular or hard to undertake 
(Wong 1998: 5).  
The discussion of welfare policies has been the most prevalent topic in recent 
years. Joyce K. Kallgren (1969) reported on the labor insurance scheme in its inception 
years.  Deborah Davis-Friedmann (1978) analyzed the “five guarantees” scheme and the 
rural relief system. Research carried out by Deborah Davis (1988) reviewed the dramatic 
change of China’s pension reform under the market economy transition. The philosophy 
of the Chinese welfare state has also been a heated topic. John Dixon (1981) claimed that 
eight ideological elements influenced welfare provision in China.2 Cecilia L. W. Chan 
(1992) pointed out that the current Chinese welfare philosophy is a mixture of traditional 
values and socialist ideology. By comparing the Western and traditional Chinese ideas of 
social welfare, Nelson W.S Chow (1987) demonstrated that China had a long history of 
social welfare dating to the Zhou Dynasty. Raymond Kwok-hong Chan and Ming-sum 
Tsui (1997) confirmed Chow’s assertion. In addition, they pointed out that in recent years 
                                                 
2 The eight ideological elements, as John Dixon (1981) specified and summarized by Cecilia L.W. Chan 
(1992), are the Confucian welfare legacy; the proletarian work ethic; egalitarianism and social justice; 
mutual aid and the collective spirit; the virtues of diligence, frugality and thrift; self-reliance; the 
continuing class struggle; and the ‘mass line’. 
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traditional Chinese welfare practices had been very much institutionalized into a Western 
welfare state.  
Studies of the Chinese welfare state have been heavily influenced by the 
economic reform initiated in the late 1970s. Chan (1992) identified that the rapid 
economic and social transformation from a centrally planned economy to a market 
economy destroyed the old socialist welfare system while the effort of developing a 
Western welfare state remains to be seen. Cecilia L. W. Chan and Nelson W. S. Chow’s 
More Welfare After Economic Reform? (1992) offers a longitudinal and theoretical 
overview of the Chinese welfare state’s development in the economic reform era. Chan 
and Chow reviewed major periods of China’s welfare development and transformation 
and found that China “is actually using a mixed model in welfare delivery” (Chan and 
Chow 1992: 134). Their survey results confirmed that the economic reform greatly 
destroyed Chinese traditional values and that the residual model of the welfare state is 
being replaced by a structural welfare system.3  
Most studies are more specific, focusing on the changes occurring in individual 
welfare schemes, rather than attempting to cover the welfare system as a whole. Victor 
W. Sidel and Ruth Sidel (1975) reviewed the Chinese health care service in the pre-
reform era and found that the health of Chinese people had improved markedly since the 
Communists came to power. Gordon G. Liu and his colleagues (2004) assessed China’s 
recent efforts in restructuring its urban health insurance schemes. Martin Feldstein (2004) 
                                                 
3  A structural welfare system, as Chan and Chow (1992: 19) argued, is based on the ideological 
commitment to political and economic equality to all. The CCP and the Chinese government provided 
welfare benefits to Chinese citizens through work units, Street Offices and Residents’ Committees, local 
Civil Affairs Departments, and many other channels. 
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examined the social security pension reform in the late 1990s. Lessons from the reform of 
China’s welfare schemes have been well discussed. Gerald Bloom and Gu Xingyuan 
(1997) argued that the market reform in China’s health sector distorted health providers’ 
behavior and therefore jeopardized Chinese people’s health. Xingzhu Liu and Willian C. 
L. Hsiao (1995) found that the market reform changed Chinese hospitals’ financing and 
payment policies which in turn led to a rapid escalation in health care expenditures. 
Recent studies have been more quantitative than ever in methodology. Chan and 
Chow (1992) reported their survey results indicating that most Chinese citizens (93%) 
prefer generous welfare provision by the State. H. Naci Mocan and his colleagues (2004) 
investigated 6,407 Chinese urban households and found that the escalation of health care 
costs contributed to the increasing inequality in access to medical care. John S. Akin et 
al. (2003) conducted a longitudinal survey examining the changing characteristics of the 
health insurance distribution in China in the period of 1989-1997. They found that quite 
contrary to common assumptions, disparities in health insurance coverage between 
different social groups actually declined during the market reform era. These quantitative 
studies of the Chinese welfare state appear to be only in their infancy.  
 
3. The Role of the State in Welfare State Studies  
The role of the state in the emergence and establishment of welfare states has 
been well documented. Based on how the role of state is considered, current literature on 
welfare state expansion can be divided into two camps. One camp tends to overlook the 
role of the state in the structuring and, more importantly, expansion of welfare state. This 
approach stresses factors such as economic growth and demographic change rather than 
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state intervention. The most influential work in this camp has been Harold Wilensky’s 
(1975) The Welfare State and Equality, which emphasizes the determining role of 
impersonal economic factors. The role of the state as described in this approach, therefore, 
is passive since the state only responds to social needs and acts correspondingly. The 
other camp values and emphasizes the state’s active role in the development of welfare 
states which, apparently, have evolved in different ways. This has generally been 
identified as the active state approach with Gosta Espoing-Andersen’s (1990) The Three 
Worlds of Welfare Capitalism as the most representative work. The active state approach 
holds that political institutions and politics play the leading role in the development of 
welfare. A strong state has its own agendas in developing welfare programs (Orloff and 
Skocpol 1984). It does not necessarily respond to or act on social needs or forces. The 
variations in welfare states, therefore, must be the results of the choices and actions of 
states rather than merely independent economic and demographic factors. 
 The passive state thesis includes the first generation of welfare state studies, 
typically the logic of industrialism theories. This approach has well documented the 
common trajectory of rising welfare state expenditure throughout the developed world 
(Wilensky and Lebeaux 1958, Kerr et al. 1960, Pryor 1968, Rimlinger 1971, Wilensky 
1975). The main arguments developed in this approach are well known. This approach 
argues that rapid industrialization creates a demand for public welfare spending as 
traditional social networks in agrarian societies are eroded and therefore rendered 
incapable of supporting continuously impoverished urbanities (Kerr et al. 1960). Wage 
workers gradually become a primary social body in industrial societies. Their 
vulnerabilities, however, grow significantly when they get sick, old, or lose their laboring 
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ability at any stage of their lives (Pampel and Weiss 1983). The logic of industrialism 
thesis is also supported by empirical studies. For example, Wilensky (1975) claimed that 
the root cause of the welfare state was the gap created by economic growth and 
demographic change which, in return, resulted in rising life expectancy and aged 
population.  
 The passive state approach stresses the economic perspective in evaluating the 
expansion of welfare states (Aaron 1967, Musgrave 1969, Wilensky 1975, Wilensky et al. 
1985). The economic perspective in welfare state studies is very straightforward. This 
perspective claims that states are passive in establishing welfare programs as they simply 
supply what is demanded by the public within the context of available resources. Jerald 
Hage et al. (1989) conducted a time-series cross-sectional research on the correlation of 
economic growth and welfare state expansion. Based on data from four industrialized 
countries (Britain, France, Germany, and Italy), however, they found no evidence in 
favor of the economic perspective argument. Hence, they ruled out state wealth or 
availability of resources as the cause of escalating social expenditure. “At least for these 
states (Britain et al.),” they claimed, “major decisions about public resource allocation 
are made independently of the level of wealth available for the state.”(Hage et al. 1989: 
256)  
 As for the active state approach, the most important piece of work is indisputably 
Esping-Andersen’s (1990) the Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. He introduces a 
series of variables such as power structure, institutional setting, and state-market 
interaction that have been overlooked in the passive state approach. He also thoroughly 
discusses welfare state regimes efforts of de-commodification and degrees of state 
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intervention. He claims that the state should be placed in the center of welfare state 
studies when it comes to differentiating welfare state regimes: 
We have seen that market-based regimes, as in the United States, were made 
possible by active and direct government policy; status privilege, of course, is 
a legacy of corporatism and authoritarian etatism; and the universalist social-
citizenship model is clearly only possible where the state crowds out both 
markets and corporatism. The state thus stands in the center of how we define 
regime-types (Esping-Andersen 1990: 103). 
 
 Various studies have explored the role of states who are actively involved in the 
expansion of welfare programs (Rimlinger 1971, Heclo 1974, Orloff and Skocpol 1984). 
Bismark’s creation of an etatism welfare system is well known. Other examples are the 
welfare legislation in the first Lloyd George government (Hay 1975) and Mussolini’s first 
six years (Lipset 1960, Neufield 1961). According to Hage et al. (1989), welfare state 
studies that regard the state as a responsive actor should all be labeled as using the 
passive state approach. Thus the economic model which stresses the availability of 
resources, the modernization model emphasizes political development (Lipset 1960), and 
the interest group model (Weir et al. 1988, Skocpol 1992, Amenta 1998) or class 
conflict/mobilization model (Huber et al. 1993, Hicks 1999) which emphasizes the role 
of election and parties aggregating interests from below, should all be ruled out of the 
active state approach (Hage et al. 1989). The reason is straightforward: all of these 
models regard the state as a responder rather than an active actor with its own agendas 
and strategies. 
 Hage et al., on the other hand, examine the active role of the state in a narrow 
sense. The state, as they argue, is nothing more than a Marxist-Leninist governing body, 
or the superstructure as a whole dealing mostly with issues of governance and rule. Hage 
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et al. agree to some degree that the active state approach does not have to completely rule 
out all players other than the state itself. They deliberately state that “[w]e do not feel that 
the active sate thesis requires demonstrating that the state is also non-responsive to the 
availability of resources or the extent of debate as reflected in modernization measures.” 
(Hage et al. 1989: 24-5)  
 Thus state bureaucrats have emerged to the center of Hage et al.’s deliberation. 
They have repeatedly enunciated that the state pursues its own strategies (Hage et al. 
1989: 24-5). The responsible player that acts on behalf of the state, according to their 
argument, is the state bureaucracy. This is a body of people who have developed 
administrative skills through years of governing experience (Orloff and Skocpol 1984). 
The state bureaucrats thus want to expand their domain. They also develop a particular 
image of an advanced industrialized society and make it the goal of the country that they 
are managing (Thomas and Meyer 1984, Ramirez and Boli 1987).  
 In sum, both the passive and active state approaches bring important points to 
light in welfare state studies. While stressing different perspectives of the welfare state 
and its expansion in history, these two theories provide valuable threads and inspirations 
for this study of the Chinese welfare state to build upon. The passive state approach 
regards the state as a responsive body in the process of welfare policy making. It testifies 
that the growing revenue surplus, class conflict and mobilization, or institutional setting 
or power structure of a particular type, have enabled and sometimes even forced the state 
to act in certain ways. Thus, welfare state studies could be done through analyzing and 
comparing differences in these areas across national borders. The active state approach, 
in comparison, looks at the state’s direct and active role in the construction of welfare 
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programs. It makes a perfect sense if noting that in a strong state such as China, the state 
bureaucrats seize a huge amount of resources and possess both the administrative skills 
and institutional ability to formulate a welfare state they can image. This is actually what 
has happened in China, a country in which state bureaucrats have inarguably dominated 
the policy making process.  
 
4. The Active Role of the Chinese State in Welfare State Studies  
Admitting the active role of the Chinese state will plot this dissertation in two 
aspects. First, noting the active role of the Chinese state makes the indisputable 
monopoly of the Chinese government less abrupt. The path-dependency theory claims 
that institutions are self reinforcing (Collier and Collier 1991, Pierson 2000). In modern 
societies, extensive policy arrangements fundamentally shape the incentives and 
resources of political actors (Rose 1990). Therefore, policies and institutions once created 
are usually remarkably durable. In the China’s case, a strong role of the state has been in 
place since its first dynasty – the Qin Dynasty – was established in 221 B.C. The 
dominant role of the government has since been well integrated into ordinary Chinese 
people’s life.  
Secondly, the Chinese state continues to play an active role in the reform era 
albeit the market reforms introduced into Chinese society the demand-supply 
mechanisms which have science competed with the state power. The market reforms 
have since the early 1980s injected multiple institutional changes into China’s centrally 
planned economic system. However, the transitions did not give the strong role of the 
Chinese state a full brake. The Chinese state and its government continue to shape, 
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although no longer monopoly, the policy making on economic development and welfare 
provision.  
It is noted that China’s leaders have borrowed much of their modern welfare 
ideology from other socialist states, particularly the former Soviet Union (Chow 1988). It 
is also well known that socialist states tend to spend more generously on welfare 
programs than their capitalist counterparts. For example, Lukianenko (1978) examined 
several socialist countries and found that even economically laggard countries such as 
Cuba and Mongolia had instituted elaborate social security programs which indicated that 
these countries regarded such provisions as essential features of their societies. The 
reason, as argued by Lukianenko, is that the governments of the socialist states take an 
active role in managing their welfare programs (Chow 1988). As quoted by Chow, 
Lukianenko summarizes the socialist style of welfare state. He wrote: 
They (socialist countries) take a direct share in making rules which define the 
various forms of social security, fix their level and conditions of entitlement, 
and governing their financing and administration; and they decide on the 
award of benefits in cash and kind and other forms of social protection. (Chow 
1988: 8)  
 
 The Chinese welfare state fits the active state model very well. First, the state 
actively and directly involved in almost every field of welfare provision (Tang and Ngan 
2001). For example, a comprehensive Labor Insurance Regulations (LIR) policy was 
adopted by the Chinese government as early as 1951 when many advanced industrial 
countries could not afford a full-fledged social security system. The installation of the 
LIR was unprecedented, especially when considering the Communist government had 
seized power less than two years earlier and the state’s economy was still in chaos 
(Mackerras 1998, Tang and Ngan 2001).  
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A strong political overtone prevails in the Chinese social welfare concept. By and 
large, every welfare measure is installed in the name of serving socialism, and the welfare 
state’s ultimate goal is to support socialist construction (Dixon 1981, 1982, Mok 1983, 
Tang 1999). Socialist workers, as masters of the socialist state, are entitled to the most 
privileged social welfare benefits (Mackerras 1998). These benefits provided by the 1951 
LIR and the later on revised regulations have also included some special articles aimed at 
improving workers’ livelihood. The fact that workers do not have to contribute towards 
the social welfare program indicates that benefits are not work-related, but are forms of 
state subsidies, or more specifically rewards based on their social status (Chow 1988). 
Compared with rural people, urban residents receive more benefits and better coverage in 
almost every welfare program. Model workers, particularly those who are directly 
employed by the government in the military or in government service, and even veterans 
receive preferential treatments.  
Secondly, the passive state thesis which claims that the state is constrained by 
available resources in welfare provision does not adequately explain the Chinese welfare 
state in its infant years. As well discussed in the previous chapter, the Chinese 
government introduced a comprehensive and generous social security system that it could 
barely sustain in the early 1950s (Walder 1986, Leung and Nann 1995, Shaw 1996). Not 
only did the Chinese welfare provision surpass many developed industrialized countries, 
its complexity and generosity also overtook some socialist states such as Cuba or Poland. 
This is even more impressive when considering that the country was by and large an 
agrarian society. Actually, the heavy financial burden it placed on the center government 
and the failure of a workable administration finally disabled the 1951 LIR (Chow 1988). 
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Many tempting welfare benefits such as longtime paid sickness leave, full compensation 
for injured persons, and old-age pension were either revoked or disregarded due to the 
financial shortage facing the central government.  
 Thirdly, the trajectory of the Chinese welfare state expansion does not conform to 
the interest group model or the class conflict/mobilization model. Since its establishment, 
the Communist government has announced in its political creed the ambitious plan of 
eliminating the exploiting classes (landlord, capitalist, etc.). It states in the Preamble of 
the 1982 Constitution that “[t]he exploiting classes….. have been eliminated in our 
country.” Political settings in China do not allow much room for the maneuvering of 
actors such as political parties, interest groups, or social classes that claim unique 
interests. The winning coalition does exist in the Chinese politics. However, it has been 
ruling-oriented rather than interest-sharing. The sort of coalition forming tendency in 
policy-making arenas so characteristic in other countries has been absent in China’s 
politics. For example, Article 1 of the 1954 Constitution states the country “is a socialist 
state under the people’s democratic dictatorship led by the working class and based on 
the alliance of workers and peasants.”  
Although the Constitution lays down the grounds for workers and peasants 
participating in the national politics, it does not provide an adequate avenue for ordinary 
people to voice their opinions, exert their constitutional rights, or participating in the 
governing process. The institution equivalent to the parliaments found in most Western 
countries is the National People’s Congress. Article 2 of the 1954 Constitution states that 
“[a]ll power in the People’s Republic of China belongs to the people.” And people can 
exercise state power through “the National People’s Congress and the local people’s 
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congresses at different levels.” However, compared with the ruling party’s branches set at 
different administrative levels, the people’s congresses have less power in legislation, 
budget, and personnel. Not only have the people’s congresses been firmly controlled by 
the party, they also have less authority than the administrative system. The people’s 
governments can easily revoke personnel decisions made by the people’s congress at 
their level. They can disregard the congress’s budget bills as well. For example, the 
people’s governments at almost every level maintain an extra-budget which is totally out 
of touch of the local congresses. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Due to the limited access to qualified data sources and the complexity of welfare 
schemes, most studies avoid giving a general evaluation of the Chinese welfare state. In 
addition, scholars have not reached a consensus on the definition or the adequate 
methodology of conducting research of the Chinese welfare state. As a result, studies of 
the Chinese welfare state have been quite inadequate. First, research efforts have been 
mainly qualitative. Only in recent years have studies began to introduce quantitative 
methods in the study of welfare matters (Wong 1998: 7). Second, very few systematic 
level studies have been conducted. Most studies have been concentrated on individual 
welfare perspectives or programs such as occupational welfare or the old-age pension 
scheme. Third, Chinese welfare policies have changed radically since the economic 
reform. Many studies fail to summarize these changes and evaluate their impacts on well-
being of the Chinese people and instead devote excessive attention to historical and 
ideological matters.  
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Debates about the role of the state are far from being settled. It is quite reasonable 
for active-role proponents to argue against the passive approach given modern welfare 
states require the active involvement of the state in the design of a more redistributive 
welfare system. In contrast, arguments in favor of the passive role of the state place more 
emphasis on factors such as economic development, political change, and social 
transitions associated with industrialization and urbanization. Studies on welfare states 
have been conducted in both directions.  
Previous research on the Chinese welfare state has focused exclusively on the 
active role of the state. Current literature indicates that socialist states have been known 
for generous welfare provision to workers. The CCP leaders, for a long time have been 
under heave influences from leading socialist states, have taken welfare provision as a 
critical sign of the superiority of socialism. Not only has the Chinese government laid the 
ground for China’s comprehensive welfare system, but it has shouldered the funding and 
daily operation of the major welfare programs, namely pensions, health insurance, 
housing allowance, and unemployment compensation (after 1998) until the market 
reforms were initiated in the early 1980s.  
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CHAPTER 3: The Chinese Welfare State in Transition 
 
In 2004, China’s State Council issued a white paper entitled “China’s Social Security and 
Its Policy.” This was one of many recent efforts made by the Chinese government to 
fulfill its vow of restoring its social security programs. In the white paper, China’s social 
security is portrayed as an important socio-economic system which should be 
correspondently invested in to facilitate economic development and social stability (State 
Council 2004).  
In this chapter, I will fully discuss China’s social security and welfare schemes. 
After a brief review of the traditional welfare programs and the philosophy, I turn to the 
demonstration of the Communist Party’s effort of building a full-fledged socialist welfare 
system. The course of the socialist welfare state is divided into two phases with the 
market reforms introduced in the early 1980s as the partition. The Chinese socialism 
fever led to a full-fledged welfare system in its infant years. Fiscal shortage and 
institutional failures, however, ruined it in less than three decades. During the reform era, 
the majority of rural people and many urbanites were vulnerable to social diseases 
associated with the process of modernization.  
 
1. A Transition Society 
China is a rapidly industrializing country with a huge population of 1.3 billion and 
escalating regional and social imbalances (Table 3.1). In recent years, the Chinese 
government has begun to notice that the social tensions associated with such uneven 
development and insufficient welfare spending could become a roadblock to its ambitious 
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Table 3.1 Comparing China’s GINI Coefficients with Some Other Regions 
Regions 1980s 1990s Difference 
China [1981 and 1995] 
 28.8 38.8 +10 
Eastern Europe 
 25.0 28.9 +3.9 
High-income Countries 
 33.2 33.8 +0.7 
South Asia 
 35.0 31.8 -3.2 
East Asia and the Pacific 
 38.7 38.1 -0.6 
Middle East and North Africa 
 40.5 38.0 -2.5 
Sub-Sahara Africa 
 43.5 47.0 +3.5 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 49.8 49.3 -0.5 
Source: World Bank, 1997. 
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economic blueprint. Obviously, the economic boom has not benefited everyone in China. 
Despite popular expectations, the rapid economic growth witnessed in the 1990s failed to 
provide a safety net for those who might be called the losers from China’s market reform.  
Chinese leaders have often found themselves unprepared when facing soaring 
social disputes which result in public demonstrations and riots. Former Premier Zhu 
Rongji, in office in 1998-2003, expressed to media in 2000 that the building of a 
comprehensive social security system is a crucial issue for China’s reform, development 
and stability (People’s Daily Dec. 14, 2000). One of the chief tasks for the current 
Premier Wen Jiaboa is to establish a modern social security system which will lay the 
ground for further reforms in the economic field. In his 2007 government work report, 
Premier Wen pledges that the government will promote a new rural cooperative medical 
sytem (RCMS). The old RCMS was the pillar of the rural security system in the pre-
reform era. It was completely destroyed when the market reforms were initiated in the 
early 1980s (Shi 1993, Ho 1995).  
Premier Wen also promises to do more to build a nationwide social security 
system which, as many government officials expect, will remedy the imbalanced 
development. A more than ten percent increase in social security spending is said to bring 
the government budget of 2007 to 201.9 billion yuan, about one percent of the 2006 GDP 
(People’s Daily Online March 07, 2007). The new generation of Chinese leaders wants to 
construct a harmonious society. With this in mind, the government has made the 
restoration of a variety of social security programs and welfare schemes a priority on its 
agenda and budget plans.  
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1.1 The Communist Takeover 
 Before the 1949 the Communist takeover, China was dominated by the 
Nationalist Party (or Kuomingtang). As the first republican government in the Chinese 
history, the Republic of China (ROC) was founded by the Nationalists in 1911 when the 
party overthrew the Qing Dynasty and forced the Qing Emperor to resign. The Japanese 
invasion during World War II forced the government of the ROC to retreat to western 
China. The country split into three parts which were controlled by the Nationalists, the 
Communists, and the Japanese occupation forces respectively. After the Japanese was 
defeated in 1945, the Nationalists and Communists fought a civil war to determine who 
would dominate China. The Communists won the war and established the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. It is not necessary to give a detailed introduction of the 
Chinese modern history. Since its first republic government founded in 1911, China had 
been in civil wars or the war against the Japanese invasion during which Chinese people 
was given no break to increase their well-being, leaving alone the economic growth. The 
historical perspective of China matters in this dissertation only when considering that 
welfare provisions in the pre-Communist period were by and large absent. The common 
characteristics prevailed in developed countries that people relied on state in difficult 
times, therefore, did not exist in the republic China before the Communist takeover. 
 
1.2 The Overpopulation Challenge 
The PRC is the most populous nation in the world. By the end of 2004, its 
population reached 1.3 billion, approximately twenty percent of the world population. 
Overpopulation has been a roadblock to development since the mid-1970s when the 
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Chinese government first noticed the aggressive population growth was increasing 
pressure on its economic. A nationwide policy on birth control was encouraged by the 
Deng Xiaoping government in 1979. Although the birth control policy was not legally 
enforced, it still had an enormous and extensive impact on Chinese society. Institutions 
supervising the implementation of the birth control measures were placed at every level 
of government. Every township government had a “Birth Planning Commission,” headed 
by a Commissioner whose sole responsibility was to enforce birth control policy.  
The one-child policy brought down China’s natural population growth rate to 0.59 
percent in 2004 (Table 3.2). The tightening of birth control measures and the increase of 
life expectancy turned China into an aging society (Table 3.3). In 2000, the average life 
expectancy reached 71.4 years old. By 2004, the aged population (65+) reached 8.58 
percent of the total population (CSYB 2005: 96-7). 
The population in urban areas has grown significantly since 1949. Shortly after 
the establishment of the PRC, the CCP greatly encouraged industrialization. As a result 
more labors flowed to urban areas where industrial enterprises congregated (see Table 
3.1). In the period of economic rehabilitation, roughly from 1949 to 1952, the industrial 
sector experienced an annual growth rate of thirty percent (Beijing Review, June 29, 
1979, p.21). The founding fathers of the PRC viewed this instant industrial output as a 
confirmation of the superiority of socialism.  
China’s undisputed leader at the time, Mao Zedong, was determined to rebuild a 
new China that would resume its rightful place among nations as a world power. During 
694 national enterprises (Hughes and Luard 1961, p.40). The number of employees in the 
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Table 3.2 Natural Population Growth and Aged Population in Selected Years,  
1950-2004 (%) 
Year Natural Population Growth 65+ Population/Total Population 
1950 1.90 - 
1955 2.03 - 
1960 -.46 4.88 
1965 2.84 4.34 
1970 2.58 4.25 
1975 1.57 4.37 
1980 1.19 4.72 
1985 1.12 5.15 
1990 1.44 5.52 
1995 1.06 6.35 
2000 .76 6.81* 
2004 .59 - 
Source: CSYB, various issues. 
* This figure is for 1999. 
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Table 3.3  Average Life Expectancy at Birth in Selected Areas* 
Year Area covered Both Sexes Male Female 
1950 Urban areas in Beijing…  53.9 50.2 
1953 Urban areas in Beijing…  61.2 60.5 
1957 70 cities, 1 county and 126 towns in 11 
provinces and municipalities… 57.0   
1957 Nanning, Liuzhou, Guilin and Wuzhou… 64.0   
1964 Urban areas in Shanghai  69.3 72.3 
1972 Urban areas in Shanghai  71.7 73.8 
1975 Selected areas in 26 provinces and 
municipalities … 
Of which: Cities… 
                 Counties 
 
68.2 
69.7 
67.2 
 
67.2 
68.4 
66.4 
 
69.3 
71.0 
68.1 
1978 Selected areas in 23 provinces, 
municipalities and autonomous regions… 
Of which: Cities… 
                 Counties… 
 
68.2 
71.3 
67.9 
 
67.0 
69.4 
66.7 
 
70.0 
73.2 
69.2 
1980 Selected areas in 25 provinces, 
municipalities and autonomous regions…
 
69.0 
 
67.9 
 
70.2 
1981 The whole country from 1982 population 
census… 
 
67.9 
 
66.4 
 
69.3 
Source: China Social Statistics 1986, p.91. 
* Calculated by using the standard formula of average life expectancy at birth. 
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industrial sector quickly jumped from fifteen millions to twenty one million (Table 3.4). 
At the same time, the Communist government initiated a socialist transformation of 
capitalism in the sectors of industry, trade, and transportation. In 1958 the Great Leap 
Forward (GLF)4 was launched. During this time the number of employees in the 
industrial sector reached seventy million, the highest in Chinese history. 
 
2. Traditional Welfare in China 
 China’s long history is characterized by dynastic rule. Seven major dynasties 
dominated China beginning with the first emperor Ch’in Shih-huang (personal name 
Ying Zheng) who unified the Chinese state in 221 B.C.. Since Ch’in Shih-huang every 
Chinese ruler has struggled to keep the country in one piece. Ch’in Shih-huang was the 
emperor of the Chinese State of Qin from 247 B.C. until 221 B.C. when he finally unified 
the country by standardizing the Chinese units of measurements, currency, the length of 
cart axles, and the legal system.  
Due to its long history, distinct features, and homogeneous population, Chinese 
society has been highly developed and unified both culturally and politically. Noting this, 
the low level of welfare provision by the Chinese state in the pre-republic era is 
inexplicable. Generally, states with a stable central government provide better welfare 
benefits to their citizens than fragmented regimes (Hage et al 1989: 272). The German 
Empire, for example, was the first regime to initiate and install a nationwide insurance 
scheme for industrial workers. Social relief or poor law programs both have typically
                                                 
4 The Great Leap Forward was an economic and social plan implemented from 1958 to 1960 which aimed 
to use China's vast population to rapidly transform mainland China from a primarily agrarian economy into 
a modern, industrialized communist society. 
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Table 3.4 Urbanization and Industrialization in China in Selected Years 
Year Urbanization* Industrialization# Industrial Employee! 
1950 11.18 - - 
1953 13.31 19.80 1707 
1955 13.31 21.00 1891 
1957 15.39 25.40 2115 
1958 16.25 31.70 7034 
1960 19.75 39.00 4059 
1965 17.98 31.80 2376 
1970 17.38 17.38 3479 
1975 17.34 17.34 5075 
1980 19.39 19.39 7707 
1985 23.71 23.71 10384 
1990 26.41 26.41 13856 
1995 29.04 29.04 15655 
2000 36.22 36.22 16219 
2004 41.76 41.76 16920 
Source: CSYB, various issues 
* urban population as percent of the total population 
# industrial outputs as percent of the nation’s gross output 
 ! employees in industrial sectors (in millions) 
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been state-dominated social policies and were both present and widely implemented 
during the early industrialization stage in strong states such as Britain and France.  
A bias of economic development level or state’s financial capability might exist 
when associating government strength with welfare provision. Many argue that states 
originally became involved in welfare provision because industrialization profoundly 
changed social structures and resulted in the erosion of traditional social support 
networks (Wilensky and Lebeaux 1965, Rimlinger 1971). The logic of industrialism 
typically holds that the emergence of a welfare state reflects the reluctance of states in 
assuming the responsibility of welfare provision. The economic model, an approach 
viewing state activity strictly based on economic considerations, proposes that states are 
passive in welfare provision and meet people’s demands only when resources are 
available (Hage et al 1989: 11-13). Issues related to state intervention in welfare 
provision have been addressed by many respected scholars.  
Compared to the main players such as the working class, elderly groups, 
bureaucrats, and legislative institutions, state intervention is seemly a minor factor in the 
game of welfare. However, state intervention has never been ruled out as a crucial factor 
in welfare studies simply because the maintenance of a political order is one of state’s 
ultimate goals (Hage et al 1989). It is not surprising to find that strong states have been 
active in setting up comprehensive welfare programs. For example, before the modern 
welfare state emerged, both Britain and France had well-established “Poor Law” systems. 
Authoritative governments in German and Italy were pioneers in installing health 
insurance and actively intervened in education. 
Chinese imperial governments developed comparable poor relief systems to the 
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previous “Poor Law” systems in Britain or France before the development of modern 
welfare states. The Chinese emperor claimed himself to be the son of heaven and borne 
with the responsibility of relieving the destitute. However, his responsibility was based 
on his position as the son of heaven rather than on any duty to the people or sense of 
justice (Zhao 1983). Thus China failed to develop a rights-based welfare system in its 
long dynastic history. Although the emperor and his ministers promised people relief 
during natural disasters, they did this for social control rather than people’s well-being.  
An excerpt from the Book of Rites, a classic Chinese document whose author and 
data of publication are unknown provide a clear recording of the people’s desire for a 
welfare state. It states that: 
When the word prevails, people seek the good of the whole society, select the 
wise to govern and stress trust and social harmony. As a result, people not 
only take care of their relatives and children, but also work hard to ensure that 
all the elderly are well cared for, the strong have opportunities to put their 
energy to good use and the young can grown up in healthy ways. The 
widowed, lonely, disabled and the sick should all be provided for…. This then 
will be the ideal states. (Chow 1987) 
 
In the pre-republic era, state involvement in welfare provision was minimal. For 
example, the government’s disaster relief of the Sung Dynasty (960-1279 A.D.) was 
extremely meagre. Quoted in Chan and Chow’s More Welfare after Economic Reform, 
the following paragraph gives a sense how minimal the government disaster relief was in 
the Sung Dynasty. 
The people coming for food would not die if they have one meal a day. 
Therefore, the healthy ones would only be given a meal a day. They have to 
come to the refuge early in the morning or the night before, and then be 
provided with rice congee after mid-day…. The principle is not to fill them, so 
that they will look for other alternatives of earning a meal, and will not return. 
(Chan and Chow 1992: 11) 
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Most Chinese imperial governments provided welfare protection and services to 
people only for the purpose of mob control and prevention of civil disobedience (Deng 
1986: 7, 99, Wong 1992: 334). Throughout the centuries, China has earned the reputation 
of being a “land of famine” (Mallory 1926). Disasters such as droughts, floods, pests, bad 
weather, and other acts of nature have frequently plagued China. Although many 
historical works document a long tradition of famine and disaster relief by the state (Tsu 
1912, Mallory 1926, Meng and Wang 1986), such aids can be described as anything but 
adequate. As mentioned above in the quotation from Chan and Chow’s work victims of 
disasters received only one meal per day and could hardly survive. The widespread 
famines coupled with the irresponsibility of government relief resulted in more than ten 
thousand civil rebellions. Of the seven major dynasties in Chinese history, six were 
directly created by rebellious peasants or the result of peasants’ revolutions against 
famine and despotic rule. 
The dominant ideology of Chinese Confucianism 5 advocated governing by virtue 
and filial piety (or xiao). For centuries, Chinese society was governed by the five cardinal 
human relations (wu lun) laid down by the Confucius. They are relations of ruler and 
subject, father and son, husband and wife, older brother and younger brother, and friends 
(Analects of Confucius). Traditional values advocated by Confucianism emphasize social 
harmony and political order. Confucius proposed that good governors should treat their 
subjects as their children. In other words, the kind of authority exercised by the father in a 
patrilineal family is the ideal model for political rulership (Schwartz 1985). Of all the 
                                                 
5 Confucianism is a complex system of moral, social, political, philosophical, and religious thought which 
has dominated the culture and history of East Asia up to the 21st century. It could be viewed as the “state 
religion” in East Asian countries because of governmental promotion of Confucianist values and needs. 
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traditional values underlying the Chinese welfare concept, none surpasses the perception 
of family duty (Li and Wu 1985). Many old sayings emphasize that the family is the 
primary social care unit. Even today in China most rural Chinese still believe “men rear 
sons to provide for old age.” (Wong 1998: 26)  
 
3. Welfare Policies after 1949 
Most modern welfare schemes were not available until the Communists came to 
power in mainland China. Prior to the establishment of the PRC in 1949, welfare was no 
more than charity provided by private individuals and social groups (Rys 1971). Chinese 
imperial governments only provided at most meagre relief to disaster victims. Welfare 
provision was not considered an obligation of the state, but rather regarded as an 
expression of benevolence from emperors or landlords when exercised. Provincial and 
local leaders (xiangshen) occasionally did offer food or shelters to people affected by 
calamities; however, these welfare provisions were rather short-lived and unorganized in 
pre-republic China. Family and friends were the primary care units in Chinese society. 
They were also the last resort for the majority of Chinese during difficult times. The 
rights-base welfare system which developed in Western societies in the late nineteen 
century was by and large nonexistent in pre-Communist Chinese society. 
 
3.1 Social Security 6 
The newly established Communist government was quick in assuming the 
responsibility of welfare provision. The CCP inherited a backward economy with 
                                                 
6 In China, it is also called labor insurance, or more usually social protection after 1990. 
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infrastructure and industrial equipment almost completely ruined from war. However, 
this did not impair the CCP’s ambition of building a socialist state with a full-fledged 
welfare system providing its war-torn people with a variety of benefits. In 1950, the first 
social welfare measure Relieving Unemployed Workers Regulations (jiuji shiye gongren 
de banfa) was adopted to resolve the postwar unemployment and poverty. This temporary 
welfare measure was soon replaced by the Labor Insurance Regulations (LIR), which 
became the official law on March 1, 1951.  
The LIR was a comprehensive social insurance scheme which applied to workers 
and staff employed in state-operated, joint state-private, private and cooperative factories, 
mines and their subsidiary units with more than 100 employees. Persons employed in 
capital construction, railway, shipping or postal and telecommunications enterprises and 
their associated units were covered by the LIR as well. In 1953, the LIR was revised to 
extend its coverage to administrative organs, mines, factories, and subordinate units 
associated with those targeted enterprises. Temporary workers and apprentices were 
given full access to the LIR benefits. As a basic social insurance law, the LIR was further 
modified in 1958 and 1978 respectively. But the fundamental principles of the LIR were 
relatively maintained and still remain valid regulations on labor insurance today. 
The LIR was both comprehensive and generous in welfare provision to workers. 
Labor insurance in the regulations included old-age pensions, health insurance, workers’ 
compensation, paid sickness leave, maternity benefits for women and many other welfare 
services (White and Shang 1996). The protection of workers’ health was made the 
primary objective of the LIR. Article 1 states that “[t]hese Regulations are 
formulated….for the purpose of protecting the health of paid laborers and easing the 
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special difficulties in their livelihood.” People whose health might be jeopardized due to 
their work responsibilities were entitled old-age pensions. Article 4 states that people 
engaged in a harmful working environment “shall be entitled to enjoy the remuneration 
of old-age pensions.”  
A strong socialist welfare ideology prevailed in the LIR. It states in Article 7 of 
Chapter II that the expenditure on the benefits enjoyed by workers “shall be borne by the 
administration or capital of each enterprise which practices labor insurance.”  This was a 
fundamental principle first laid down by V. I. Lenin in 1912 and was practically 
consolidated in 1922 with the Russian Labor Law (Madison 1979). The LIR also 
mandates in Article 8 that enterprises should pay into a labor insurance fund a sum equal 
to three percent of their total payroll. It also states that “[t]hese labor insurance funds 
shall not be deducted from the wages of the workers and staff members nor be separately 
collected from them.” This social insurance fund was put under the supervision of the 
All-China Federation of Trade Unions and its subordinates. It was used to provide for 
old-age pensions and other collective welfare undertakings. 
The 1951 LIR was the most advanced and extensive welfare program in the 
world, even compared with the welfare programs in the most advanced industrialized 
countries at that time. Workers wounded while at work were given full access to medical 
treatment at hospitals or clinics with the costs completely borne by the work unit. During 
the treatment period, injured workers could receive the first three months’ wages in full 
and 30-60 percent of their wages for the next three months if the medical treatment 
continued. As for pension, a male worker could retire at 60 if he had worked at least 25 
years. Female workers could retire at 50 if they had worked at least 20 years. After 
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retirement retirees were to receive a pension with the sum of 35-60 percent of their wages 
at retirement from the labor insurance fund. Maternity leave compensation was generous 
as well. A female worker could be granted full wage for 56 days before or after giving 
birth. In addition, she could have up to 30 days leave with full payment during her 
pregnancy.  
Compared with urban areas, social security was limited and underdeveloped in 
rural areas. Social security in rural areas could largely be characterized as minor income 
maintenance measures. Throughout history, Chinese society has been an agricultural 
entity and rulers in each dynasty developed their governing philosophy by encouraging 
cultivation and maintaining the feudal order in rural areas. Between 1950 and 1951, the 
Communist government undertook a thorough land reform assigning each household a 
piece of cultivable land. The land became the primary source of income for Chinese 
peasants. However, a second land reform in the middle 1950s compelled peasants to join 
collectives which later became the People’s Communes, centrally controlled property 
with enforced egalitarian distribution (Guan 2000). As a result, Chinese peasants were 
deprived of their income from land. They began to rely on collectives for both livelihood 
and welfare.  
In fact, rural people have never been entitled to any formal pension scheme. Paid 
sickness leave or work-related injury compensation might have existed in some People’s 
Communes, these benefits never became long-term or organized measures.  The Chinese 
government did not have the necessary financial resources or personnel to undertake such 
a huge project as providing pensions to China’s hundreds of millions rural residents.  
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3.2 Social Welfare and Relief  
Relief work in China was divided into disaster relief and social relief. The 
Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA) is the current government body in charge of relief 
welfare work. Before 1978, the MCA was known as the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
(MIA) which apart from welfare was also in charge of a number of political and 
administrative programs. In urban areas in order to be eligible for relief from state one of 
three requirements had to be met. The first requirement was the “Three-Nos,” referring to 
those who have no family support, no work ability, and no means of livelihood 
(Minzheng Cidian 1987: 168-9). The second group who was eligible for state relief was 
poverty-stricken households. Households with several disabled people or many young 
children were deemed to lack the ability to support themselves, and thus fell into this 
category. Finally, aged workers who were laid of during the nationwide austerity period 
(1961-1965) and had already reached the retirement age were eligible to receive a 
monthly relief equal to forty percent of their former wage.  
The primary source of welfare benefits for rural residents was the Five Guarantees 
(wubao) system. This community-based social relief system developed as the main 
institutional arrangement for the most vulnerable social groups in rural areas (Chen 
1994). Namely, the Five Guarantees included the provision of food, clothing, fuel, 
funeral services, and school fees to disabled or aged people in rural areas free of charge. 
This system was formally introduced during the collectivization period in the mid-1950s. 
This system soon became a widely established welfare measure due to the 
communization effort in 1958 and remains essentially unchanged today. Since the Five 
Guarantees system was a community-based welfare scheme, its finances and operations 
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were tightly controlled by commune leaders. Each cooperative commune was to decide 
what would be adequate for the people covered by the scheme, but in no case was aid to 
exceed the average quota of the commune. Thus, the Five Guarantees system provided 
only the minimal welfare to the most disadvantaged people in rural areas. By and large, it 
was a means-tested scheme since the entitlement was given to people who would not 
survive themselves and had no relative to rely on. 
 
3.3. Health Insurances and Services 
After the promulgation of the 1951 LIR, the Chinese government issued several 
health insurance regulations covering different social groups. In 1952, the Administration 
Council (State Council) issued a set of regulations regarding health care for employees at 
different levels of the People’s Government, parties, organizations, and their subordinate 
units. The State Council also issued the Government Employee Health Insurance 
Schemes (GIS) which laid down the principles regarding health care benefits for workers 
in public sectors. Both the LIR and the GIS were financed by general revenues. The 
regulations from these two documents provide generous health insurance benefits for 
urban residents. Beneficiaries can receive large outpatient and inpatient services with no 
charge. Employees in public sectors and collective enterprises can receive full 
reimbursement on all medical treatments and drug expenses.  
In rural areas, the Rural Cooperative Medical System (RCMS) was the primary 
health insurance program. It provided the rural population with basic health services for 
free or at a very low price in some districts. During the 1960s and 1970s, the RCMS was 
widely established in rural areas and fully supported by the government. It was reported 
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that more than ninety percent of China’s villages had established a RCMS by the mid-
1970s (Carrin et al. 1999). The RCMS generally used the production brigade as its 
primary accounting unit. The RCMS was a subsidized community-based insurance 
program which employs local individuals trained as paramedics. Trained health workers 
provided limited curative services and referred patients to more sophisticated health 
facilities such as township or country hospitals if needed. 
The RCMS was financed by three primary sources of revenue: a very small 
portion of individual contributions collected by the commune, collected welfare funds, 
and subsidies by the local county’s general revenue. During the 1960s and 1970s, the 
RCMS was mostly financed by the People’s Communes as the rural economy was 
collectively organized and distributed. However, with the People’s Communes gradually 
being phased out in the late 1970s, the RCMS has since imposed severe financial burdens 
on collectives and the state (Figure 3.1). 
 
4. Welfare Programs in the Reform Era 
During its socialist construction and consolidation period, the new Communist China was 
by and large an agricultural society. The Communist leadership determined to mimic the 
Soviet central planning mechanism and industrial structure to seek instant 
industrialization. Progress was quickly made and rapid industrialization was achieved. 
This progress was widely celebrated and viewed as a vital sign of socialism’s superiority. 
The likelihood of confrontation with Taiwan coupled with the military disputes 
with the U.S. in North Korea and then in Vietnam led China to focus on developing 
heavy industry. 
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Figure 3.1 Financing and Distribution of the RCMS 
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Things began to change when the political environment became more amicable and the 
country was integrated into the international community. Since the mid-1980s, the 
Chinese welfare system has experience a series of reforms. Deng Xiaoping launched the 
market reforms in the early 1980s. As a result China experienced an economic boom and 
the country was flourishing until state enterprise reforms caused unemployment 
problems, leaving millions of workers jobless. In 1984 shortly after the announced 
reforms of major state-own enterprises (SOEs), the old-age pension reform was 
promulgated. Two years later in 1986, unemployment insurance was formally established 
in urban areas. Reforms on maternity insurance, work-related injury insurance, and health 
insurance for urban employees were later undertaken in 1994, 1996, and 1998 
respectively.  
In 1993, Shanghai took the lead by setting up its Minimum Living Standard 
Security System (MLS) for urban residents. In 1997, the State Council sent out a notice 
requiring the establishment of similar systems in all cities of the nation. By the end of 
1999, a MLS had been established in 667 cities of different sizes and in 1,682 counties 
across the nation. Thus far the system has greatly benefited the non-agricultural 
population in many areas. By the spring of 2001, some 4,160,000 persons were benefiting 
from the system, with an average monthly allowance of 60 yuan (US$7.3) per person 
(People’s Daily December 24, 2006)   
The rural Minimum Living Standard Security System (RMLS) was carried into 
execution in 2006. China would establish subsistence allowances for the rural poor all 
around country. This ambitious mission was to overseen by the MCA. A pilot system was 
first established in Guangdong and Zhejiang provinces in 1997. Since then, among 
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China’s 2,862 counties, over 2,000 have thus far established the system. People’s Daily 
reported on December 24, 2006, about ten million rural poor had benefited from 
subsistence allowances, accounting for 42 percent of the rural population under the 
influence of poverty. 
 
4.1 The Labor Contract System and Urban Laid-offs 
The Chinese government has pursed an active policy of employment since its 
ambitious economic construction goals were first promulgated in the early 1950s. 
Throughout the 1960s, various effective measures aimed at increasing the rate of 
employment were adopted and implemented (Chan and Chow 1992, Wong 1998). The 
full employment policy is the result of the socialist ideology of promoting an egalitarian 
society. It has prevailed in Chinese society while the economic construction was set as 
the upmost goal.  
With the market mechanism being introduced to replace the faulty planning 
system, the industrial structure also experienced radical changes in the 1980s. First, the 
heavy industry priority was abandoned. The Chinese leadership noticed that setting heavy 
industry as the primary sector was no longer necessary as the nation had stepped out of 
the cloud of severe external threats. The state’s chief objective now became achieving 
rapid economic growth and improving people’s living standard (Oi 1996, 1999, Yao 
1999). The government began to stress the development of labor-intensive enterprises 
with comparative advantages and market potential. As a result of the new development 
strategies, the Chinese economy witnessed a boom in small and medium-sized enterprises 
capable of offering employment to a large number of people. Many township and village 
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enterprises (TVEs) were founded and eventually integrated to the Chinese economy 
during this period.  
Secondly, the reform of SOEs forced its way onto the public agenda. Although it 
actually came after the reform initiated in rural areas, the reform of SOEs launched in the 
early 1980s captured much of the attention of external observers (Naughton 1995:7, 
Lardy 1998). The first phase of enterprise reforms was the increasement of operational 
autonomy accorded to enterprise managers who, not surprisingly, were mostly party 
cadres or government officials enjoying benefits associated with their rank. The primary 
weapon used to encourage management responsibility was the profit retention policy. 
This policy was widely adopted in state enterprises in 1979-1980. Enterprise-retained 
profits were used by managers to increase investments, improve workers’ wages or 
benefits, or allocate rewards for distinguished workers. The second phase of state 
enterprise reform was the introduction of the labor contract system in 1984 (Nauthton 
1995: 262-3). A famous slogan of the reformers was “breaking the iron rice bowl” 
(Putterman, 1992). This referred to the reformers’  
intention of lessening the income and job security of the individual state 
employee who, heretofore, is said to have felt little pressure to perform on the 
job; and to the parallel aim of reducing the financial security of the state 
enterprise managers who, while now provided with some incentives to 
increase profits, could continue to expect state subsidies in the even of losses. 
(Putterman, 1992) 
 
However, what the enterprise reforms really did to the state employee was far beyond 
the promotion of work ethic. For various political reasons, the urban working class had been 
benefiting from being employed by state enterprises as permanent wage earners. The real 
income of state employees far exceeded their cash wages due to the value of subsidies, 
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insurance, and other benefits they received (Ibid). One of the most significant impacts of the 
SOE reforms was workers’ decreasing reliance on enterprises they were working for. As a 
result of the urban reforms, state control over the financial resources and the behavior of 
workers was weakened. Moreover, the private sector began to expand into areas traditionally 
dominated by state enterprises. Table 3.5 explains the changes of employed workers in the 
public and private sectors from the pre- and post-reform era. 
Reforms of the SOEs were of highest concern in China (Putterman 1992, Walder 
1995). Three basic goals were to be achieved during the enterprise reforms. First, every 
enterprise was required to negotiate a contract with the appropriate level of government 
to set up an adequate profit and taxation level. Second, enterprises were urged to 
undertake overall reforms. Life-long employments, fixed salaries, and inadequate welfare 
provision were going to be gradually abandoned. Third, enterprises were forced to sell 
their products in a competitive market and were mostly excluded from government 
subsidies. World Bank conducted a study on China’s taxation system reforms and found 
that more than 80% of enterprises had contracts with their respective governments 
(World Bank 1990). 
 
 
Table 3.5 Employees in the Public and Private Sectors in the Chinese Urban Economy in 
1980 and 1995 (% of total employees) 
 1980 1995 
 State-
owned Collective Private 
State-
owned Collective Private 
Employed 
Workers 76.2 23.0 0.8 64.7 18.1 17.2 
 Source: China Statistical Publishing House (1996), China Statistic Yearbook (1996), p. 
30. 
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Enterprise reforms led to the disconnection of individuals with their work units. 
Compensation for laid-off workers was used to ease the transition to privatization during 
enterprise reforms and also helped promote production efficiency in state sectors. This 
design allowed SOE managers to fire employees at a mutually agreed compensation. It 
was estimated that nearly 26 million (one-fifth of the total workforce) in SOEs are laid 
off from 1998-2002 (World Bank 2003). A market economy requires that workers’ wages 
should reflect productivity. Thus the “iron rice bowl” policy or lifelong job security and 
cradle-to-grave welfare guarantee were necessarily replaced by a contractual employment 
system. Enterprise reforms also introduced labor market elements. First, the power of 
managers in collective and SOEs was increased significantly. They were given the 
freedom to hire, discipline and dismiss workers. Second, as early as 1984, the newly 
introduced contractual employment system allowed SOEs to treat the new workers 
differently from the tenured workers. Recently hired workers received neither lifetime 
employment nor the same level of non-wage benefits.7 
 
4.2 Reforms in the Welfare System 
 In response to the enterprise reforms and surging of urban laid-offs, in the early 
1980s the Chinese government carried out a set of reforms in its social welfare regime 
with the goal of establishing a standardized social security system independent of state 
enterprises and institutions (Appendix I). This new social security system was to extend 
its coverage to both employed and unemployed people (Table 3.6). In contrast to the old 
                                                 
7 For details about the differences between old labor regulations and the labor contract system introduced in 
the 1980s, please refer to The Administration and Financing of Social Security in China by Nelson W. S. 
Chow, pp.77-80. 
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Table 3.6 Selected Social Security Schemes and the Coverage, 1994-2004 (10,000 
persons) 
Unemployment Insurance Medical Insurance Work Injury Insurance Year 
Contributors Beneficiaries Contributors Contributors Beneficiaries 
1994 7968 196.5 374.6 1822.1 5.8 
1995 8238.0 261.3 702.6  2614.8  7.1  
1996 8333.1 330.8 791.2  3102.6  10.1  
1997 7961.4 319.0 1588.9  3507.8  12.5  
1998 7927.9 158.1 1508.7  3781.3  15.3  
1999 9852.0 271.4 1509.4  3912.3  15.1  
2000 10408.4 329.7 2862.8  4350.3  18.8  
2001 10354.6 468.5 5470.7  4345.3  18.7  
2002 10181.6 657.0 6925.8  4405.6  26.5  
2003 10372.4 741.6 7974.9  4574.8  29.5  
2004 10583.9 753.5 9044.5  6845.2  51.9  
Source: CSYB 2005, table 23-38. 
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system which was directly financed from the government’s general revenue or enterprise 
profits, the new social security system was to be funded from various channels and 
socially managed. Also at this time a mandatory state-supervised social security system 
was implemented to meet people’s basic welfare needs. With China’s rapid progress after 
its economic reforms, the social security network was said to eventually cover the entire 
population. In 2004, the government allocated 462.7 billion yuan to be used for social 
security payments, 38.27 times greater than the figure for 1989 (CSYB 2005: table 23-
39). 
The state also began to actively promote a multi-level social security and welfare 
system. A second-line social welfare and relief scheme aimed at helping disadvantaged 
groups was initiated. After more than a decade, a social welfare system covering the basic 
needs of various social groups had roughly been established. The majority of urban staff 
and retirees, urban unemployed, and floating peasant workers in some regions were 
protected against poverty associated with catastrophic illness and unemployment. Five 
welfare schemes aimed at improving the efficiency and equality of the welfare system 
were gradually implemented. In the following sections, I will discuss these new programs 
in detail. 
 
4.2.1 The “Two Guarantees” and “Three Lines of Protection” 
As the main goals of welfare reform were to facilitate the economic transition and 
to improve market efficiency the process of welfare reform has been very pragmatic. It 
has been piecemeal since welfare reforms were initiated at different times and adopted to 
meet different needs. The market reforms in urban areas consisted largely of remedial 
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responses to the institutional dysfunction of the centrally planned economic system. 
SOEs, as the primary targets of the market reforms, were forced to cutting back the 
pensions and health care benefits for their employees. “Redundant workers,” mostly older 
or poorly educated persons, were laid off to improve productivity. The market reforms 
basically shut the door of “full employment” and therefore the “iron rice bowl” policy 
was no longer available for urban residents. A more competitive labor market was 
gradually installed to facilitate the enterprise reforms. With the new labor policy, wages 
became separate from various employer-provided benefits, and the unemployed were to 
be taken care of by the new social security programs rather than by the enterprise they 
had been laid of from. 
In order to transfer the enterprise-based welfare system to a community or 
society-based system, the Chinese government adopted a “two guarantees” policy in 1998. 
The first guarantee is the basic livelihood of the workers laid-off from SOEs. The 
government established reemployment service centers for laid-off workers. These centers 
provide laid-off workers with allowances or basic living expenses and social insurance 
premiums. The second guarantee was given to all retirees from state sectors. Their basic 
livelihood was ensured and basic pensions were paid in full with the reemployment 
service funds. The “three lines of protection” were implemented to ensure the “two 
guarantees” policy. First, laid-off persons from SOEs can receive a basic living allowance 
(jiben shenghuo baozhang) from the reemployment service centers for up to three years. 
Second, in case they still have not found a job within three years, they can receive 
unemployment insurance payments (shiye baoxian jin) for a maximum of two years. 
Third, if they remain unemployed at the end of this two-year period, they can apply for 
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the minimum living standard allowance (zuidi shenghuo baozhang fei), to which all 
impoverished urban residents are entitled. 
 
4.2.2 The Minimum Living Standard Security System 
 The reforms of the urban social relief system began in 1993. After the market 
reforms had been in place for more than a decade, the population of urban laid-off 
workers and long-term unemployed grew to a level that the government could no longer 
overlook. Since social stability has always been a top priority for the Chinese government, 
the reform of the urban social relief system pushed its way to the top of the public agenda. 
In 1999, a Minimum Living Standard Security System (MLS) was installed in all cities 
after several years of trial in selected cities. Meanwhile, the Chinese government 
officially promulgated the Regulations on Guaranteeing Urban Residents’ Minimum 
Standard of Living to ensure the basic livelihood of all urban residents. 
 Financing and management of the MLS are shouldered by the fiscal budgets of 
local governments. The allowances of the MLS are also determined by local governments 
based on the necessary costs for maintaining the basic livelihood of the local urbanities. 
The urban population covered by the MLS has been increasing significantly. In 2001, 
eleven million urban residents are reported to have drawn the minimum living allowance. 
That year the total budget for the MLS reached 2.3 billion yuan or about one percent of 
the central revenue (People’s Daily December 24, 2006). Since 2005, some rural areas 
have been preparing to introduce similar minimum living standard security systems 
which, if established, will cover an even larger portion of the Chinese impoverished 
population. 
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 4.2.3 The Old-Age Insurance System 
 The first attempts to reform the old-age insurance system were made in selected 
cities in 1984. After a decade of trials and careful evaluations, in 1997 the Chinese 
government finally adopted the Decision on Establishing a Uniform Basic Old-Age 
Insurance System for Enterprise Employees. This regulation has since been widely 
implemented throughout the country. Employees of all urban enterprises may participate 
in the basic old-age insurance program. Enterprises and employees in towns and cities 
have been required by the Labor Law8 to pay the basic old-age insurance premiums. At 
present, roughly twenty percent of the enterprise payroll bill and eight percent of personal 
wages are automatically saved to the insurance accounts. 
 The urban old-age insurance system has two separate accounts (Figure 3.2). One 
is a mutual assistance account and the other is a personal account. These mutual 
assistance accounts are established by funds taken from the basic insurance premiums 
collected from enterprises. The remaining funds are used to set up the personal accounts. 
The basic old-age insurance premiums paid by individuals go entirely into their own 
personal accounts. Normally, a retiree can draw from the mutual assistance funds to 
which only the enterprises are required to contribute. A monthly payment of up to twenty 
percent of the average social wage is paid out of the mutual funds. In additional, the 
retiree can draw monthly from his personal account up to 1/120 of the total accumulated 
amount. 
 
                                                 
8 Chinese labor law consists of a multiplicity of national and local laws. The Labor Law Act (Labor Law of 
the People’s Republic of China) in force since January 1, 1995, represents the most significant legal source 
in this area. Local regulations supplement national law but modify it in some areas. 
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Figure 3.2 Funding and Benefit Structure of the Social Insurance Program (Liu 2002b) 
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Participants in the old-age insurance program increased from 86.71 million in 1997 to 
108.02 million by the end of 2001 (CSYB 2004: 195). The number of basic old-age 
pensioners also jumped from 25.33 million to 33.81 million. In 1991, China began to 
introduce the old-age insurance system in some affluent rural areas. The basic principle 
for the rural old-age insurance system is different from the one installed in urban areas. 
The premiums are to be paid mainly by the beneficiaries rather than the institutions they 
are working for. There are collectively pooled funds available for rural participants as 
well. Personal accounts are available to encourage saving for old age. 
 
4.2.4 The Medical Insurance System 
 Before the market reforms, urban residents relied heavily on their work units to 
pay for medical services. Under the command economic system, the employees received 
the benefits while the employers bore the costs. In 1988, the State Council formed a 
group to plan the formation of a health care reform program. In 1992, their planning 
resulted in the introduction of risk pooling in urban medical insurance reforms. Pooling 
risk was the key institutional innovation that radically increased the level of socialization 
and correspondingly reduced welfare differences among urban residents. In addition, an 
individual medical insurance account was created on behalf of every insured urban 
resident. This is called the social insurance program (shebao jihua). 
 The Decision on Establishing the Basic Medical Insurance System for Urban 
Employees was officially issued in 1998. With this regulation, the Chinese government 
began to enforce a basic medical insurance system for urban employees throughout the 
country. By the end of 2001, 97 percent of prefectures and cities had created a basic 
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medical insurance scheme. About 76.29 million employees had participated in a basic 
medical insurance scheme. In addition, free medical services and other forms of medical 
security systems covered more than 100 million urbanities (see Appendix I). 
 
 4.2.5 The Unemployment Insurance System 
 Unemployment insurance was by and large nonexistent in the pre-reform period 
since the Chinese government had been pursuing an active employment policy. The “full 
employment” and “iron rice bowel” have been well known policies of the Chinese labor 
law. However, the market reforms and economic transitions in the early 1980s radically 
altered the Chinese labor policy on unemployment. In 1999, about two decades after the 
market reforms, the Chinese government issued the Regulations on Unemployment 
Insurance. The new regulations mandate that all urban enterprises and their staff mush 
pay the unemployment insurance premiums. The contribution for enterprises is two 
percent of the salary payment to the employee. For the employee, the contribution is one 
percent of his or her total wage income. An unemployment insurance participant can 
draw benefits from the insurance funds if three conditions are met. First, he or she must 
have paid at least one year of insurance premiums. Second, his or her unemployment 
status must not be a voluntary one. Third, the unemployed person must register with 
reemployment centers and apply for reemployment. Since the installation of the 
unemployment insurance system, the coverage has grown continuously. The number of 
participants has increased from 79.28 million in 1998 to 103.55 million in 2001 (see 
Table 3.7).  
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5. Conclusion 
 This chapter introduces the Chinese welfare state programs in both urban and 
rural areas. Policies about welfare provision have been subjects of major reforms and 
subsequent readjustments since the early 1950s. Before the market reforms radically 
altered welfare policies in the early 1980s, the Chinese people received generous welfare 
benefits from the state. Basically, the state and work units cooperatively provided a full 
range of social security schemes to urban residents. Apart from the absence of 
unemployment insurance due to the Chinese government’s “full employment” policy 
orientation, urban employees enjoyed old-age pensions, sickness leave compensation, 
medical insurance and health service, maternity benefits, and other various perks such as 
free housing, low-cost education, and food stamps or subsidies. 
 Welfare programs in rural areas, however, are underdeveloped and poorly funded. 
The gap between urban and rural areas grows continuously when the market reforms 
profoundly remake China’s production mechanism and income distribution. In the pre-
reform era, peasants could receive social relief and welfare benefits from the state. Many 
welfare programs with a relief purpose were installed because the centrally planned 
economy enabled the government to allocate fiscal resources to help the destitute. During 
difficult times, rural households could rely on local governments. But the majority of 
peasants did not have access to pension, housing allowance, or food subsidies which 
enjoyed by urbanities.  
 A strong socialist ideology dominated the welfare policy making in the pre-
reform era. As early as 1951, the CCP had made a comprehensive social security system, 
the LRS. This labor insurance scheme was revised in 1953 to extend its coverage to 
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almost all urban residents. Welfare benefits provided by the state and work units were 
both comprehensive and generous even in western standard. The CCP claimed to be the 
liberators of the Chinese people who were exploited by domestic and international 
capitalists and feudal landlords. Before the CCP came to power, the Jiangxi and Shananxi 
Communist regimes had tried to establish social welfare and relief programs. Slogans 
such as “beating landlords and allocating land” and “removing the three big mountains”9 
were widely spread to gain peasants and workers’ support. In 1949 leaders of the newly 
established People’s Republic of China announced that the regime was to base on the 
firm coalition of workers and peasants. The Communist regime had since installed a 
comprehensive welfare system which was hardly affordable. 
 The financial burden associated with the social security and welfare programs 
escalated to an intolerable level in the early 1960s. The government began to shift the 
financing responsibility to work units and individuals. Although insurants of LRS were 
given full coverage and rarely asked to pay the premium, their welfare benefits had been 
decreasing. Some work units were in bad financial condition and thus could not provide 
even the basic social security and welfare benefits to their employees. After market 
reforms were implemented, income gap between employees in different work units grew 
quickly. In the early 1980s, workers of some loss-making SOEs made most complaints 
about their shrinking welfare benefits. 
 Since the early 1990s, the government has pragmatically restored some state or 
market-financed social security and welfare schemes. The government has noticed that 
                                                 
9  The three big mountains, according to Mao Zedong are imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic 
capitalism. 
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pooling welfare funds can significantly lower risks and costs that were previously borne 
by individual work units. New welfare programs were experimented in selected provinces 
and promulgated throughout the country when passing necessary tests. For example, 
unemployment insurance was widely adopted in the early 2000. It has become one of the 
basic social rights for employees in urban areas. In the reform era, increasing 
comprehensiveness of the social security system becomes obvious. Self-employed or 
unemployed urban residents can receive welfare benefits from the government and 
market-funded welfare schemes. An effort to reduce the urban and rural welfare benefit 
gap has become a serious concern of the government. Since 2005, the rural minimum 
living standard has been gradually raised to 650 yuan ($84.5) per year. Medical insurance 
is available to rural people. The new RCMS lays down the ground for peasants to enjoy 
low-cost medical services.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 73
CHAPTER 4: China’s Multiple Transitions and Welfare Spending:  
General and Specific Factors 
 
Some states have actively involved in the construction of welfare systems while others 
have been rather passive. Nonetheless, as time goes on more advanced and 
comprehensive welfare systems continue to develop around the world. Debates about the 
state’s role in welfare state expansion have been less about why welfare states expanded 
than why they had developed in such different ways (Myles and Quadagno 2002). 
Welfare systems in different countries seem to be developing in many different ways, and 
this is certainly true in China. So the questions to consider now are: Why the Chinese 
welfare state has developed the way it has? How have factors such as China’s long 
dynastic history and huge population influenced this development? Another important 
issue to consider at this point is China’s astounding income gaps between urban and rual 
areas. The rapid catch-up industrialization pursued in the last few decades, the path-
breaking but gradualist-mannered economic reforms (Pei 2006), and the recent 
astounding economic growth will all be considered in this chapter in an effort to examine 
what a socialist welfare state with Chinese characteristics really means.  
 This chapter discusses China’s multiple transitions and the impacts they have 
placed on the government’s welfare spending. I will demonstrate these impacts by 
exploring the general and specific factors. The general factors are elements coping with 
macro perspectives of the Chinese economic reforms. They are the approaches scholars 
developed to examining the contradiction found in China’s economic growth and welfare 
spending. The Chinese welfare state is at odds with many advanced Western welfare 
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states which raise budget on welfare during economic prosperity. The specific factors are 
consequences of the general factors. These factors represent the institutional transitions 
that I believe to have influenced the development of the Chinese welfare state. They are 
discussed in their relevance to welfare spending. These specific factors are to be further 
examined in the subsequent chapter in which they are the independent variables. 
 
1. The General Factors 
The Chinese economy has flourished in recent years experiencing a rapid GDP 
growth rate of ten percent for more than a decade (Zheng 1994, Walder 1995b). As many 
researches have discovered, China’s rapid rise is highly correlated with various factors 
including institutional innovations, economic reform, and cultural mobility (McKinnon 
1992, Nee 1992, Cui 1994, Oi 1992, 1996, Jefferson and Rawski 1994, Rawski 1994a, 
1994b, Walder 1994a).  
 
1.1 The Economistic State Orientation 10 
The development strategy adopted by the Chinese government has attracted 
scholars from many disciplines (Walder 1995b, Duckett 1998, Chen 2002, Burns 2003). 
Researchers have examined the Chinese development strategy through various 
approaches including culture and society, economics, and institutions. Before the 1990s, 
however, most studies on the Chinese economic reform were conducted by scholars who 
were interested in the Chinese economic development rather than the evolvement of the 
                                                 
10 By economistic state orientation, I mean the state is actively involved in and dominates the nation’s 
economic activities. State bureaucrats also personally participate in commercial sectors or directly manage 
enterprises and, therefore, are held responsible for economic growth and profit-making.  
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Chinese society. Few of them attempted to build the correlation between changes in 
Chinese society and the ongoing economic reform (Peng, 1992, Walder, 1989, Xie and 
Hannum, 1996, Yao, 1999, Zhou, 2000).  
The trajectory of the Chinese economic reform and growth indicates that 
reformers are explicitly pragmatic. Minxin Pei (2006: 25-9) points out that China’s 
reform is a strong gradualist model. The Chinese leadership does not conceal the 
incremental and pragmatic economic reform. For example, the former Chinese leader 
Deng Xiaoping said that whether white or black, a good cat is the one which catch the 
mouse (Goldstein 1995). Similar statements have been pervasive in governmental 
publications and speeches by political leaders. Some scholars suggest that these 
documents and speeches have expressly articulated the Chinese governing body’s 
intension of embracing economic growth as the primary goal (Ibid).  
Since the 1980s, an economistic developmental strategy has been introduced and 
widely implemented in Chinese society. As an omnipotent power, the CCP does not have 
to create a broad-based coalition. According to David Waldner (1999), a broad coalition 
means more side payment for costly welfare policies while narrow coalitions cost less 
and enable the government to allocate scarce resources to the most productive sectors of 
the economy. The Chinese-style gradualist reform does not detonate the privatization 
avalanche as witnessed in Easter European countries and the former Soviet Union. 
Instead the active involvement of state bureaucrats in the economic sector has created a 
strong economistic developmental strategy. As Jane Duckett (2000) points out, state 
entrepreneurialism often creates problems of uneven service provision, especially the 
underinvestment in social welfare. This strategy leads policy-makers, primarily state 
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bureaucrats, to abandon long-sustained social welfare policies such as low cost medical 
plans, high investment in public education, general revenue financed pensions, and public 
housing systems.  
The economistic developmental strategy is embedded in the pattern of the 
government revenue and expenditure (Figure 4.1). In 1951 the Chinese government 
reaped 12.4 billion yuan of revenue. The total expenditure in that year was 12.2 billion 
yuan.  In the next thirty years, that is the period from 1951-80, the government made a 
decuple revenue growth and the expenditure rise was approximately the same size. In 
1980, the revenue and expenditure reached 115.99 billion yuan and 122.88 billion yuan 
respectively. This sharp growth happened after the economic reforms were introduced. 
From 1980 to 2000, both the revenue and expenditure experienced a decuple growth 
(Table 4.1). The growth rate clearly accelerated at a rapid pace as the second decuple rise 
was achieved in less than twenty years. 
Since the 1970s, the welfare expenditure of the Chinese government has been 
very stable (Figure 4.2). Approximately two percent of GDP was used for welfare 
purposes in each year (Table 4.2). Due to the economistic state orientation, the Chinese 
government only spends an average of 1.58 percent of its total expenditure on social 
security and welfare. This spending is extremely low as compared to the government 
expenditure in advanced industrial countries such as Japan, USA, and UK. As Table 4.3 
shows, Japan’s spending on social security and welfare has been approximately 18.8 
percent of the central government’s total expenditure. The figures for the USA and UK  
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Figure 4.1  The Chinese Government Revenue and Expenditure, 1950-2004 (100 million 
yuan) 
 
Source: CSYB 2000, p. 255. CSYB 2005, p. 271. 
 
 
 
Table 4.1 The Chinese Government Revenue and Expenditure in Selected Years (in 100 
million yuan) 
Year Revenue Expenditure 
1951 124.96 122.07 
1980 1159.93 1228.83 
2000 13395.23 15886.50 
Source: CSYB 2005 p. 89. 
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Figure 4.2 Social Security and Welfare Expenditure as Percent of the Total Payroll, 1976-
1990 (% of payroll) 
Source: CSYB, various issues. 
 
 
 
Table 4.2 The Chinese Government Expenditure on Welfare, Economic Construction 
(economy), and Defense (in 100 million yuan) 
Year Total  On Welfare 
% of 
Total  
On 
Economy 
% of 
Total  
On 
Defense 
% of 
Total  
1955 262.7 4.94 1.88 137.62 52.38 65.00 24.74 
1960 643.7 7.94 1.23 460.71 71.57 58.00 9.01 
1965 460.0 10.94 2.38 254.11 57.55 86.76 18.86 
1970 649.4 6.53 1.01 392.61 60.46 145.26 22.37 
1975 820.9 12.88 1.57 481.66 58.68 142.46 17.35 
1980 1228.8 20.31 1.65 715.46 58.22 193.84 15.77 
1985 2004.3 31.15 1.55 1127.55 56.26 191.53 9.56 
1990 3083.6 55.04 1.78 1368.01 44.36 290.31 9.41 
1995 6823.7 115.46 1.69 2855.78 41.85 636.72 9.33 
2000 15886.5 213.03 1.34 5748.36 36.18 1207.54 7.60 
2004 28486.9 563.46 1.98 7933.25 27.85 2200.01 7.72 
Source: CSYB, various issues. 
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Table 4.3  Government Expenditures on Welfare and Health as Percentages* of the Total 
Expenditure in Four Countries 
China 1 
 
Japan 2 USA 3 UK 4 Year 
Welfare Health Welfare Health Welfare Health Welfare Health 
1972 1.01 -  - 32.66 8.55 24.76 12.19 
1975 1.57 - 19.83 1.34 36.60 9.34 21.68 12.90 
1980 1.65 - 18.82 0.94 34.10 10.43 26.69 13.47 
1985 1.55 - 18.68 0.88 29.07 11.29 33.74 13.73 
1990 1.78 0.75 16.57 0.81 25.56 13.48 31.88 13.19 
1993 1.62 0.92 - - 29.12 17.10 36.51 13.60 
1995 1.69 1.02 19.15 0.90 29.18 19.17 36.23 14.00 
1998 1.59 1.71 - - 28.71 20.41 36.50 15.42 
1999 1.36 2.25 - 0.72 28.75 20.50 24.76 12.19 
2000 1.34 1.47 19.74 0.65 28.25 28.55 - - 
Mean 1.58 1.35 18.80 0.89 30.20 13.88 30.31 13.41 
Source: *: percentages are calculated based on original data from sources. 
1. CSYB, various issues; Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, various issues. 
2. Japan Statistical Yearbook 1995, p.494-7; and Japan Statistical Yearbook 2004, p. 135-
39. Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, various issues. 
3 & 4. Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, various issues. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 80
are even higher. The average expenditure in these two countries is 30.2 and 30.31 percent 
respectively. Figure 4.3 suggests that the welfare expenditure of the Chinese government 
is the lowest and stagnant. 
A relatively bigger portion of the Chinese government expenditure goes to 
economic affairs. In 2001, the Chinese government spent 13.7 percent of its budget on 
economic affairs such as mining, manufacturing, construction, and fuel and energy 
(Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 2003: 111-2). During the same period, the 
USA and UK spent only 6.44 and 4.35 percent, respectively, of their total central 
government budgets on economic affairs (Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 2003: 
464-5). Figure 4.4 suggests that Chinese household and government consumption 
expenditures have sharply grown in recent years. However, household consumption as a 
share of GDP has gradually decreased since 1979 when economic reforms were first 
initiated (Figure 4.5).  
Figure 4.4 indicates that the household consumption expenditure has grown faster 
than government consumption expenditure since 1970. This suggests that the disposable 
income of Chinese households has increased due largely to the economic reforms. It also 
suggests that Chinese people became less dependent on the government during the reform 
era. In other words, Chinese people are now shouldering more responsibilities as 
compared to the pre-reform period when most spending was made by the government. 
 
1.2 The Social Impacts of Economic Reforms 
China’s economic reforms were first introduced at the end of the 1970s. These 
reforms led to the most dramatic social and economic transformations in China’s long 
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Figure 4.3 Government Expenditures on Social Security and Welfare in Four Countries 
(% of the central government expenditure) 
 
Source: *: percentages are calculated based on original data from sources. 
1. CSYB, various issues; Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, various issues. 
2. Japan Statistical Yearbook 1995, p.494-7; and Japan Statistical Yearbook 2004, p. 135-
39. Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, various issues. 
3 & 4. Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, various issues. 
 
 
 82
0.0
500.0
1,000.0
1,500.0
2,000.0
2,500.0
3,000.0
3,500.0
4,000.0
4,500.0
1970 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998
Year
B
ill
io
ns
 o
f C
hi
ne
se
 y
ua
n
   Household
consumption
expenditure
   General
government
consumption
expenditure
 
Figure 4.4 The Growth of Household Consumption Expenditure versus Government 
Consumption Expenditure in China, 1970-1999 (in billions yuan) 
 
Source: WDI 2001, World Bank. 
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Figure 4.5 Household Final Consumption Expenditures in Selected Countries, 1970-2002 
(% of GDP) 
 
Source: 2003 WDI, World Bank. 
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history. Although they were initially designed just to target the Chinese economy, these 
reforms have radically changed Chinese society by transforming “a state-socialist 
economic system to a quasi-totalitarian political system.” (Pei 2006: 1) Shortly after the 
market mechanism was introduced in rural areas, state enterprises were urged by the 
central government to conduct reforms to boost productivity and enterprise profit. These 
economic reforms, however, proved to be a double-bladed sword. On one side, 
production incentive and profit-making were greatly promoted. Many hardworking 
people benefited from this economic transition which rewarded efficiency and 
productivity. On the other side, the transition created misery and continuously punished 
those who failed to adapt to the competition-intensive society. Many people began to 
suffer from the withdrawal of social security and various other welfare benefits that were 
previously available to them. 
 
1.2.1  Rural Reforms and the Collapse of the RCMS 
In 1979, the Chinese economic reforms were introduced in the rural sector (Oi 
1999). The obvious reason for rural reforms, as Jean Oi puts it, was to seek the security of 
food production which was severely undermined by the extreme leftist line in the Great 
Cultural Revolution (Oi 1996, 1999, Yao 1999). Some studies suggest that the economic 
development in Mao’s era was very impressive. Nonetheless, people’s living conditions 
could be improved even more if production enthusiasm was not suppressed and the 
economy performed its potential (Lardy 1983). The rural reforms were a response to 
economic decline and food shortage which were feared to ultimately diminish the 
Communist regime’s legitimacy. By the end of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution 
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(GPCR), China was still a poor nation despite official statistics showing that the output of 
grain, meat, vegetables increased remarkably from 1949 to 1976. For example, the rural 
per capita disposable income in 1978 was only 285 yuan which was significantly lower 
than the poverty line of 454 yuan given by the World Bank (Yao 1999). 
The rural reforms were very successful. The reform proponents abandoned the 
previous system of collective production which was organized into Maoist “People’s 
Commune” systems. The new household productive responsibility system (HPRS) was 
more efficient and incentive-oriented. It gave peasants the opportunity to maximize their 
own economic interests through diversifying as well as marketing their production (Oi 
1999). The HPRS released the enormous productive energy of Chinese peasants. For 
instance, the grain output was merely 305 million tons in 1978. After the implementation 
of the HPRS, it grew to 407 million tons in 1984 (Yao 1999). Rural real per capita 
income doubled, rising by 14.9 per cent per year (Yao 1999). In the early 1980s, the 
income gap between rural and urban residents hardly existed.  
The Chinese post-Mao reform was described by most researchers as a gradual 
process (Goldstein 1995, Oi 1999, Walder 2002, Pei 2006). This was to a great degree 
determined by the relative stagnation of Chinese political changes. However, the Chinese 
rural reform was also a radical and abrupt transition (Walder 2002). By the end of 1982, 
the rural People’s Communes established in the Mao era were completely disbanded. One 
of the world’s most orthodox collective economies was rapidly replaced by a system of 
household production which is actually based on the private ownership. Some initial 
reform policies were radical even by today’s standards. Land was divided into small 
pieces and equally allocated among households. Strict prohibitions against household 
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production for commodity and service markets were abandoned. Permits were given to 
rural residents to leave home to seek opportunities outside the boundaries of their 
collective. Rural entrepreneurships were allowed to run small industrial businesses as a 
supplement to grain production. All these policies indicated that the Chinese 
government’s reform effort was radical, especially in the economic domain. Radical 
reform efforts were even blocked by conservative rural cadres who feared that these 
enormous changes would eventually erode their powers and privileges (Zhong 1996, 
2003). 
The Chinese rural economy was abruptly changed with the introduction of the 
market mechanism and the HPRS. Hence, Chinese local governments and officials relied 
on economic incentives instead of the old propaganda and mass mobilization to spur 
economic growth. Economic reforms generated impressive economic growth and gave 
the regime a tremendous boost in legitimacy (Oi 1999). In Chinese society, both the 
government and people were then driven by economic reform and material incentives.  
China’s development led to the emergence of many social problems in the 1990s 
as the consequences of unbalanced economic growth. Regional inequalities became 
especially evident at this time (Oi 1999). The income gap between coastal areas and 
central and western regions grew to an intolerable level. Peasant protest appeared in 
many provinces. The most significant detonator of these social unrests is believed by 
most Chinese to be the collapse of the social security and protection system. However, it 
seems that nothing can stop China’s ambitious economic reform and the unbalanced 
growth which will continue to systematically punish the “have-nots.” 
It is well known that the Rural Cooperative Medical System (RCMS) has played 
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an important role in the consolidation of rural health service. However, the RCMS 
collapsed in the early 1980s due to the widespread market economic reforms. The 
reforms initiated a shift of economic activities from the collective to households. The 
later adoption of the HPRS radically changed the delivery and financing of rural health 
services. The RCMS finally collapsed after experiencing extended financial hardship and 
medical personnel shortage. This left the majority of the rural population having to pay 
for health care out-of-pocket again.  
Prior to the rural economic reforms, the rural health sector was financed by its 
respective government, commune, and users charges (see Figure 3.1). Financial resources 
of rural health services could be divided into two main categories. One category was 
public expenditures, including government subsides and collective contributions. Another 
category was fees for services, including medical service fees and profits associated with 
drug selling. A study reveals that the government budget for the rural health sector fell 
sharply by ten percent during the period 1980-1989 (Zheng and Hillier 1995). As a result, 
township health centers and county hospitals had to shoulder the payroll payments and 
many of them operated at a deficit. Most village health workers, who were paid by the 
former communes or villages, then had to operate with a profit to survive (Liu and Mills 
2002).  
Rural health facilities began to increasingly rely upon on out-of-pocket payments 
by users of medical services. The shrinking financial support from the government led to 
the rising of service fees for township and county medical care providers. In 1989, for 
example, 20.54 billion yuan ($ 5.55 billion) of health sector income came from patients 
directly, while only 11.46 billion yuan ($3.1 billion) came from government budgetary 
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allocations (Ho 1995). In some poor counties, user charges account for over 75 percent of 
the total revenue of county hospitals and township health centers (Bloom and Gu 1997). 
The government grants financed as little as 50 percent of the budgets of preventive 
institutes and no more than 25 percent of expenditures of hospitals and health centers 
(Bloom and Gu 1997). These changes shifted the financial burden to individual 
households who then had to pay for medical services out-of-pocket. Many rural people 
who could not afford service fees were then denied access to care by hospitals.  
The established rural medical service network was thus weakened or even 
completely destroyed due to the widespread market reforms. Many skilled barefoot 
doctors in the health service left their positions because of relatively low payments. Since 
the co-operative welfare fund was depleted, the RCMS ceased to provide salary for 
medical professionals employed at township health centers. Medical care staffs in county 
hospitals were urged to negotiate contracts with their hospitals for a payment scheme. 
According to the Ministry of Health (MoH) records, the total number of barefoot doctors 
working in the countryside decreased from 1.8 million to 1.3 million between 1978 and 
1985 (MoH 1987). 
 
 1.2.2 Urban Reforms and the Social Security and Welfare 
While rural reforms generated tremendous success in promoting production and 
people’s living conditions, the urban areas remained stagnant. In 1984, four years after 
the rural reforms, China began to restructure the state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The 
rural reforms created a commercial-oriented production system which became the 
foundation for a new market mechanism (Putterman 1992). China’s industrialization had 
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been strictly conducted according to the Marxist-Leninist doctrines. The structure of the 
Chinese industry was merely a reproduction of the former Soviet Union. In the pre-
reform era, China’s industry was dominated by SOEs of various types (Byrd 1991: 4).  
According to official statistics, the public sector accounted for more than 77 
percent of gross industrial output in 1978 (Figure 4.6). This ratio was impressive since by 
the late 1990s the state sector accounted for only about 30 percent of gross industrial 
output and has continued to decline in share since.  
One of the most important goals of the urban reforms was to promote enterprise 
productivity and profit. First, new managing mechanisms were introduced into the SOEs 
to boost profit-making. Before the economic reforms, the majority of the government 
revenue came from the contribution of SOEs (Figure 4.7). Throughout the entire 1960s, 
the state sector contributed more than 80 percent of the central government’s revenue. 
Revenue from the state sector reached its peak in 1961. In that year, approximately 92 
percent of the central government’s revenue was collected from the state sector.  
However, revenue from the state sector kept declining in share in the following decades. 
In 1980, central government revenue collected from the state sector accounted for only 
about 80 percent, the lowest percentage since 1959. Due to inefficient management, 
overstaffing, and more importantly, the heavy burden of welfare expenditure for workers, 
many state enterprises operated at a deficit. The decline of SOEs badly diminished the 
central government’s revenue ability. As Figure 4-8 shows, in 1986 the central 
government’s revenue was only 20.80 percent of the GDP, the lowest percentage since 
1952.  
 
 89
 
Year
200019901980197019601950
%
 of
 G
ro
ss 
In
du
str
y O
ut
pu
t
100.0
80.0
60.0
40.0
20.0
 
Figure 4.6 State-Owned Enterprises Industry Output as Percentage of Total Industry 
Output, 1952-1999 (%) 
 
Source: CSYB 2000, table 13-3. 
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Figure 4.7 Central Government Revenue from State, Collective, and Private sectors, 
1951-1999 (% of central government gross revenue) 
 
Source: CSYB, various issues. 
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Figure 4.8 Central Government Revenue as Percentage of GDP, 1950-2005 (% GDP) 
 
Source: CSYB, various issues. 
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Secondly, hundreds of thousands of redundant workers in the state sector were 
laid-off (xiagang). Enterprise reforms led to labor force floating between different 
industrial as well as ownership sectors. Since the state sector experienced a sharp decline 
in profit-making and many state enterprises failed to provide promised welfare benefits, 
many workers began to seek opportunities in collective and private sectors. Figure 4.9 
suggests that the ratio of state employees continued increasing until it reached the peak 
value of 19.05 percent in 1982. In the middle 1980s, SOEs reforms began to drive urban 
workers to pursue employment in collective or private sectors. The share of urban 
employed persons in state sectors went down continuously. In 2004, only 8.92 percent of 
China’s active workforce was in the state sector (Figure 4.9). The growth of the labor 
force in urban private sectors is impressive. When the economic reforms were initiated in 
1980, urban private sectors only accounted for less than 0.2 percent of employment. After 
SOE reforms dramatically changed the economic system, in 2004 about 3.4 percent of 
employees were working in private sectors.  
SOE reforms displaced hundreds of thousands of state employees. These laid-offs 
workers were either let go with a wholesale one-time compensation or simply sent to re-
employment centers without any payment. Before economic reforms, state employees 
had a low average wage but enjoyed a high level of welfare provision. However, in the 
early 1980s, the urban social benefit system appeared to increasingly impede economic 
growth and efficiency. State and collective enterprises that provided the lion share of 
urban welfare benefits reduced the welfare burden to lower costs and improve 
productivity.  
 Figure 4.10 indicates that social security and welfare expenditures plunged in the 
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Figure 4.9 Labor Force in State, Collective, and Urban Private Sectors, 1952-2004 (% of 
total employee) 
 
Source: CSYB, various issues.  
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Figure 4.10 The Chinese Government Expenditure on Social Security and Welfare, 1952-
2003 (% of total payroll) 
Source: CSYB, various issues. 
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late 1970s. Since social security and welfare yielded to enterprise productivity, 
government expenditures on welfare dropped from about three percent to only 1.85 
percent of the government’s payroll. Throughout the entire 1980s, social security and 
welfare expenditures failed to recover to 1970s levels.  
Urban reforms in the social policy area involved the redefining of the welfare 
responsibilities of three parties – work units, individual employees, and the government. 
Since the top goal of urban reforms was to promote enterprise productivity, the financing 
of most welfare benefits was given less priority. Welfare responsibility began to 
gradually shift away from work units to individual shoulders and the general tax revenue.  
 
1.2.3 Institutional Decentralization and the Rise of Private Businesses 
A major change in China’s economic sector that has affected the government’s 
social security and welfare expenditures was the decentralization of the public financing 
system. In the pre-reform era, the central government collected all revenues and allocated 
a portion to provincial governments. Market reforms initiated a fundamental realignment 
of the central-local relations in the Chinese government. The most noted reform occurred 
in the fiscal administrative system and was aimed at resolving the revenue decline faced 
by the central government (Wong 1991). The central government’s budget expenditures 
shrank from 50 percent of the total revenue in the 1970s to only 29 percent in 1999 
(Figure 4.11). In 2002, nearly 70 percent of the public budget went to sub-national 
administrations. Among these funds, approximately 55 percent was distributed to sub-
provincial levels (World Bank 2003).  
The immediate subsequence of the fiscal decentralization was increasing local  
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Figure 4.11 Central Government Expenditure, 1955-2005 (% of government revenue) 
 
Source: CSYB, various issues. 
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government participation in commercial issues (Duckett 1998, Oi 1992, 1995). The local-
state corporatism (LSC) approach argues that China’s tremendous growth of collective 
economy is to a great extent due to the local government’s economic incentive (Oi 1992). 
China’s system of fiscal contracting, by granting local governments the right to collecting 
and retaining the tax revenue, motivated these local officials to promoting business in 
their districts (Oi 1992). In other words, market reforms reassigned fiscal power, in the 
term of local-central relations, downwards to local governments. In the reform era, each 
level of people’s governments was separately responsible for revenue collection. 
Revenues of the center, the central government’s tax revenue for example, were primarily 
collected by provincial and local level governments. Each government jurisdiction, in 
fact, receives its revenues from the jurisdiction below it and from the enterprises it owns 
directly (Byrd 1991).  
The decentralization of China’s governing system indicates that Chinese society is 
becoming more flexible. On one hand, the central government is losing power. On the 
other hand, both local governments and commercial sectors are gaining more control over 
resources. The CCP has attempted to build broad-based social coalitions to implement its 
policies and maintain its governing status. But massive political mobilizations have failed 
to strengthen the ruling party’s legitimacy. Instead, as observed in recent years, the CCP 
has begun to rely more than ever on economic performance to create a harmonious 
society and maintain legitimacy (Zhong 1996, Zhong and Chen 2002). 
The growth of private business has also deepened the decentralization of Chinese 
society. Private business elites have been gradually deploying their influence on 
economic and social affairs. The ruling party has changed its opinion on private business 
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and even encouraged capitalists to join the Communist Party. Previously in China, private 
business was not a part of the socialism economy. As Young (1995: 25) points out, the 
individual economy acted as a “supplement” to the state and collective sectors.  Private 
businesses, contrary to publicly owned enterprises, are “relatively free-floating.”  Under 
the market reforms, however, private businesses have grown to an even higher record. 
China’s local governments have tried to promote private businesses to resolve some 
social problems such as the mass hidden unemployment. However, the private sector, 
which has blossomed thanks to the market reforms, has challenged the ideology of state 
ownership. The accelerated growth of private businesses began to push the government to 
restructure the profitless SOEs.  
Economic reforms also lead to some institutional changes that have decentralized 
policy-making. Although the central government still enjoys a power monopoly in some 
areas, some legislative and judicial changes have taken place. These institutional changes 
indicate that the authoritarian system is under transition. In recent years, local people’s 
congresses have become an arena in which business elites and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) can voice their opinions. For example, the CCP is still the 
dominant power in appointing local high-rank officials, but the party has to rely on local 
people’s congresses to carry out its personnel decisions. Often the CCP finds that it has to 
compromise with local business elites and their interests because a big portion of 
people’s representatives is from private sectors. In both the national and local people’s 
congresses, some experts in commercial or technical fields have been appointed to 
oversee important issues. The growth of the private sector, increasing of people’s civil 
rights, and the rising rule of law all indicate that Chinese society has been diversified in 
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resource allocation and policy-making. The 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations provides a 
clear example of the increasing mass demand for political reform and freedom.  
The growth of China’s middle class is a positive indication of China’s social 
transition. With the Chinese economy consistently growing, the middle class is also 
expanding its role in Chinese society. Although the middle class in China has not been 
clearly defined, it certainly includes new business elites, private small business owners, 
as well as upper level employees in foreign or jointed venture companies. The size of the 
middle class is growing in relation to the population. It is highly possible that in the near 
future this middle class will demand more economic and political freedom. The extensive 
conflict between private business elites and the government has been uncovered in recent 
years. With several business elites having been executed or having their property 
confiscated, this class’s demands for more security and rule of law have increased 
correspondingly. 
 
2. The Specific Factors 
China’s economic growth in the past two decades has planted seeds of 
decentralization and social transitions in Chinese society. Economic growth has been the 
most important factor leading to social mobilization and transitions to a more open 
society. The Chinese economic development strategy is a gradualist approach. A gradual 
development can diminish pressures for political changes by minimizing social conflicts 
and lowering reform costs (Pei 2006: 25-27). China’s gradualist approach “has allowed 
Chinese leaders fully to exploit the structural advantages provided by favorable initial 
conditions.”(Ibid: 26)  
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Chinese society has changed enormously in the reform era. Although China’s 
leaders can delay political reforms, the society can no longer be ruled in the old ways. 
First, the Chinese state structure has been decentralized. The CCP’s monopoly has been 
weakened in the reform era. Although the CCP and the state’s privileged position has not 
been completely abandoned, the rise of a civil society has placed many constraints on its 
behavior. Second, many social movements have eroded the CCP’s legitimacy, causing 
the legitimacy to become the highest concern of the ruling party (Zhong 1996, Zhong and 
Chen 2002). The Tiananmen crackdown and subsequent democratic movements have 
brought democratic values to Chinese society. Recent social crises such as the outburst of 
SARS have showed signs of policy transparency in critical policy makings.  
Therefore, social security and welfare policy-making, as vital fields influencing 
many people’s livelihoods, have received scrutiny from many social groups. The 
government and the ruling party can no longer manipulate social security and welfare 
policy-making. A decentralized political system has accompanied the Chinese social 
transition as a result of the great economic reforms. 
 Obviously, the central government’s expenditure on social security and welfare 
has been determined by a variety of factors. In the early 1950s, the Chinese government 
began to install an ambitious socialist welfare system which extended its coverage to the 
majority of citizens. However, the 1950s welfare system was gradually repealed due to 
the lack of funds and institutional support. For example, the revoking of the People’s 
Commune and the vanishing of communal funds led to the collapse of the RCMS. 
Generally, poor countries cannot afford a well-funded comprehensive welfare 
system. Socialist states tend to provide generous welfare schemes which are hardly 
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affordable due to their usually laggard economies. As discussed in previous sections, the 
Chinese welfare state has been refurnished since the economic reforms launched in the 
early 1980s. The reforms have deeply changed the Chinese state and society. In the 
reform era, decision-making has been decentralized. Institutional transitions making 
China more capitalist have been undertaken in both economic and social areas. Thus, the 
socialist ideology of building an egalitarian society has continually faded away as 
capitalist values have gradually stepped in.  
In the remaining part of this chapter, I will orderly discuss the variables 
representing institutional transitions. Four variables, Industrialization, SOE reforms, 
Urbanization, and Decentralization each represents a substantial institutional transition 
that has shaped the Chinese welfare state. 
 
 2.1 Industrialization 
 “Logic of industrialism” theorists have claimed that industrialization led to the the 
expansion of welfare state (Wilensky and Lebeaux 1958, Kerr et al. 1960, Pryor 1968, 
Rimlinger 1971, Wilensky 1975). States begin to play a more important role (active or 
passive) when industrialization destroys traditional social networks on which people 
depend during difficult times. The “logic of industrialism” thesis placed less emphasis on 
the causal relationship than the concomitant progress of industrialization and welfare 
state expansion. It is easy to predict that a state will spend more on social security and 
welfare if its industrialization reaches a certain degree. However, it is hard to say whether 
a state will spend more or less with industrialization continuously making progress.  
 The unique experience of China’s industrialization makes it a good example for 
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examining the correlation of industrialization and welfare expenditure. Several 
remarkable issues divide the brief history of China’s industrialization into three segments. 
First, from 1950 to 1960 the Chinese leadership strictly followed Marxist-Leninist 
doctrine in creating a socialist industrial system with an overwhelming emphasis being 
placed on heavy industry. The primary goal was to rapidly promote the country from an 
agrarian society to an industrialized one. In 1952, industrial output accounted for 17.64 
percent of GDP. It reached 39 percent in 1960 (Figure 4.12). Second, from 1961 to 1978 
this rapid industrialization was disrupted because radical leftists achieved dominancy in 
politics. The whole country was in chaos due to the irrational development plan 
attempted in the Great Leap Forward Movement (GLF, 1958-63) and the Great 
Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR, 1966-76). Figure 4.12 shows the industry output 
plunged in the early 1960s. Industrial output further declined from 39 percent of GDP in 
1960 to only 29.64 percent in 1961. This 10 percent decrease in just one year is anything 
but normal. Another industrial recession happened in the very beginning of the GPCR. 
During the period from 1966 to 1968, industrial output shrank from 34.72 percent of 
GDP to 28.45 (Figure 4.12). Third, since 1979, economic reforms were introduced first in 
rural and then in urban areas. SOEs productivity was greatly promoted. In 2004, the 
industrial output reached 45.89 percent of GDP (Figure 4.12). 
 Figure 4.13 reflects a negative relation between welfare expenditure and 
industrialization. This negative relationship is reinforced when examining welfare 
expenditure on industrialization (Equation 4.1). Welfare expenditure and industrialization 
are both measured as a percentage of GDP for the observation year. Therefore, the 
Chinese government has actually under-spent on social security and welfare when 
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Figure 4.12 Chinese Industrialization, 1950-2005 (% of GDP) 
 
Source: CSYB, various issues. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 104
 
 
 
Industrial Output as % of GDP
50.040.030.020.010.0
1.2
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
Welfare Expenditure as % of GDP
Linear
Observed
 
 
Figure 4.13 Welfare Expenditure and Industrialization 
 
Source: CSYB: various issues. 
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considering the share of industrial output rising in GDP. This is contradictory to the 
“logic of industrialism” thesis which asserts a positive relationship between welfare 
expenditure and industrialization.  
                                 )011.0819.0 izationIndustrialWelfareExp −=            Equation 4.1 
        (.130)   (.003) 
 
Entries in parenthesis are standardized errors. 
 Several facts can explain the under-spending. First, the Chinese government 
overspent on welfare during its early years. Therefore, the under-spending in late years is 
not a result of industrialization but rather the unavoidable adjustment of government 
budgetary policy. Shortly after the Communist takeover, the government promulgated the 
LIR in 1951. Workers’ social rights and benefits were fully protected in the LIR and its 
later revised versions. The socialist ideology underling social security and welfare also 
spurred the government to overspend on welfare schemes, as the newborn regime viewed 
its emphasis on people’s welfare as an indication of the superiority of socialism. Second, 
during the GLF and GPCR, millions of urban youngsters were encouraged to seek jobs in 
rural areas. The urban population stagnated and even declined in some years (Figure 
4.14). Since welfare spending was heavier on urbanities as compared to rural residents, 
welfare expenditure was able to decline despite increasing industrialization. Third, in the 
early 1960s, the central government shifted the responsibility of financing welfare to state 
enterprises (Chow 1988). The government’s expenditure on social security and welfare 
decline accordingly.  
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Figure 4.14 Urban Population, 1950-2004 (10,000 persons) 
 
Source: CSYB: various issues. 
 
 107
2.2 SOE reforms 
 SOE reforms were initiated in 1984. These reforms cut welfare benefits in various 
ways. After enterprise reforms were widely implemented in the late 1980s, SOEs-
provided welfare benefits including housing allowances, health insurance, and food 
stamps were either completely revoked or reduced. First, lifelong employment was 
repealed. SOEs began to promote productivity at the cost of the workers’ job security and 
welfare benefits. Second, after the introduction of the new contractual labor system, SOE 
managers received more autonomy in firing employees. Employment in the state sector 
declined sharply in the 1990s. Figure 4.15 shows that the SOE workforce plunged from 
110 million in 1997 to 67 million in 2004, a 50 percent decrease in only six years.  
Thirdly, in contrast to the declining employment in state or collective enterprises, the 
workforce in private sectors and individual firms increased dramatically (see Figure 4.9). 
Due to the tempting cash income and flexible working schedule, many state-sector 
employees sought jobs in the private sector. Self-employed and private enterprise 
workers are not covered by general revenue financed social security schemes such as the 
LRS or GRS. Although they are still allowed to receive social welfare benefits or low-
income subsidies (as long as they hold urban residence), the financial burden they place 
on the government is quite low when compared to that of state or collective employees. 
Self-employed persons and private-sector employees have developed a high level of self-
reliance. Their pensions, housing, and health insurance are either paid out of their own 
pockets or from commercial funds. 
Figure 4.16 shows that a slightly negative relationship exists between state-sector 
employment and welfare expenditure. This means that as employees in state sectors 
 108
 
Year
2010200019901980197019601950
St
at
e-s
ec
to
r E
m
pl
ye
es
12,000
10,000
8,000
6,000
4,000
2,000
0
 
Figure 4.15 State-Owned Enterprises Workforce, 1950-2005 (10,000 persons) 
 
Source: CSYB: various issues. 
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Figure 4.16 Welfare Expenditure and State-Sector Employees, 1950-1987 (% of GDP for 
welfare expenditure, % of total employees for state-sector employees) 
 
Source: CSYB: various issues. 
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have decreased over time, government welfare expenditure has increased very slightly. A 
negative coefficient for the indicator for the state-sector employment reinforces the 
negative relationship (Equation 4-2). But the p value is 0.238 which is not statistically 
significant at the 0.01 level. There must be some other hidden factors playing. 
               ymentStateEmploWelfareExp 009.0557.0 −=              Equation 4.2 
                                                   (.119)    (.008) 
 
Entries in parenthesis are standardized errors. 
  
2.3 Urbanization 
 As China has experienced rapid industrialization since 1950, the urbanization rate 
has correspondingly increased. In 1949, when the PRC was established, the urban 
population accounted for only 10.64 percent of the total population. After ten years of 
rapid industrialization, the urbanization rate reached 19.75 percent in 1975. However, the 
Chinese urbanization did not increase consistently. There were declines and rebounds in 
the 1960s and 1970s. Figure 4.17 indicates that the urbanization rate declined during the 
time from 1962 to 1978 during which the Chinese people suffered from domestic chaos 
created by the GLF and GPCR. The urbanization rate remained stagnate at around 17 
percent between 1965 and 1978.  
 The stagnation of urbanization in the 1970s was the result of the Chinese 
government’s policy of encouraging urban young intellectuals to receive re-education in 
rural areas. Hundreds of thousands of urbanities were sent to remote rural areas to labor 
or to be “re-educated”. This was called the “Down to the Countryside” (shangshan 
xiaxiang) movement which was believed to be an efficient way of teaching young  
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Figure 4.17 Urbanization in China, 1949-2004 (% of total population) 
 
Source: CSYB, various issues. 
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intellectuals to strictly follow the Party’s mass line route11 (qunzhong luxian). Those 
urban young intellectuals that went to rural areas were called intellectual youngsters 
(zhishi qinnian). After the GPCR was ended in 1976, the movement of driving urban 
youngsters to rural areas was gradually revoked. Many intellectual youngsters returned to 
the cities from which they were originally dispatched.  
 The urbanization rate has grown consistently since 1979. In 1996, the urban 
population accounted for about thirty percent of the total population. It took only seven 
more years for the urbanization rate to reach forty percent. In 2004, the urbanization rate 
reached 41.76 percent, the peak value that has never been seen before in Chinese history. 
Figure 4.18 shows a slightly negative relationship between welfare expenditure and 
urbanization. When examining the correlation of welfare expenditure and urbanization, a 
negative relationship is found (Equation 4.3). The negative coefficient indicates that the 
increase in the urbanization rate does not lead the Chinese government to 
correspondingly raise welfare spending. Although the urban population has grown 
significantly since 1980 and welfare benefits for urbanities have been a major concern of 
the Chinese government, welfare spending has not correspondingly increased with 
urbanization. 
 
              onUrbanizatiWelfareExp 012.0557.0 −=         Equation 4.3 
                                                (.076)    (.003) 
 
Entries in parenthesis are standardized errors. 
                                                 
11 The Mass line is the political and organizational method developed by Mao Zedong and the CCP during 
the Chinese revolution. 
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Figure 4.18 Welfare Expenditure and Urbanization, 1949-2004 
 
Source: CSYB: various issues. 
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2.4 Decentralization 
 Institutional settings have been well known for affecting welfare expenditures. 
Policy making is always the key to understanding the evolution of the welfare state 
(Korpi 1989, Palme 1990, Kangas 1991). In democratic countries, for example, the power 
structure determines welfare expenditure (Cameron 1978, Stephens 1979, Castles 1982, 
Hicks and Swank 1984, Myles 1984). Resources are allocated by legislation and political 
struggle is the only way to achieve a commonly agreed upon welfare agenda or income 
distribution plan. Generally, a leftist government tends to spend more revenue on social 
security and favor re-distributive schemes while a conservative government prefers low 
taxes and pursues active reemployment. A centrally planned economic entity has been 
known for generous welfare spending because of the working-class dominancy. But the 
high welfare expenditure in socialist states is more a result of ideology than of political 
struggles or institutional settings. What if a socialist state that is undergoing capitalist-
like transitions to a market economy? Do policy making and institutional change matter 
to China’s welfare expenditure?  
 The Chinese welfare state has been a gradually evolving entity. Decentralization 
has played a significant role in China’s transition to a market economy. The first 
decentralization effort of the Chinese economy was made by Mao Tse-Tung. In 1956, he 
condemned the over-centralization in economic planning and management and called for 
study and discussion of the relationship between central and local authority (Lardy 1975). 
Thereafter, decentralization reforms encompassed the areas of industrial, commercial and 
financial management. Local revenue shares increased sharply from only 19.59 percent in 
1958 to 75.62 percent in 1959 (Figure 4.19).  
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Figure 4.19 Local Government Revenue, 1953-2004 (% total government revenue) 
 
Source: CSYB: various issues 
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In the pre-reform era, the central government received a high portion of the 
national income12 and played a determining role in welfare policy making. For example, 
the central government’s budgetary revenue share was 84.48 percent of GDP in 1978. 
After ten years of economic reforms, local governments were given more autonomy in 
resource allocation and revenue detaining. Hence, financial resources controlled by the 
central government decreased. In 1988, the central budgetary revenue share declined 
sharply to only 67.13 percent of GDP (see Figure 4.8). The budgetary revenue ratio of 
local to central changed dramatically due to the economic reforms.  
Table 4.4 shows that the share of budgetary local revenue reached its peak in 
1975. Since the economic reforms were introduced in 1980, the share of budgetary local 
revenue has been consistently declining. In 1995, the budgetary local revenue share was 
91.68, lower than the central budgetary revenue for the first time since 1959.  
 The budgetary local revenue share remained at over 60 percent of the total 
budgetary revenue during the entire 1960s and 1970s (see Figure 4.19). This share 
declined visibly in the early 1980s. In 1984, the budgetary local revenue accounted for 
only 59.49 percent of the total budgetary revenue, the lowest percentage since 1959. 
From the mid-1980s to the early 1990s, however, the budgetary local revenue share 
increased at a steady rate. This was the start-up period for the SOE reforms. The central 
government gave up some financial constraints it previously used to yoke local 
governments. Instead of being commanded to strictly follow the central government’s 
plan, the local governments were encouraged to pursue developmental agendas of their  
                                                 
12 The Chinese budget system is a complicated issue. Extra-budgetary revenue for both central and local 
governments has been a common phenomenon. In this dissertation the regular budget plus the extra-budget 
are used as the main indicator. 
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Table 4.4 Local and Central Shares of Budgetary Revenue, 1953-2004 (100 million yuan) 
Year Local Revenue  Central Revenue Local/Central (%)* 
1953 36.22 177.02  20.46 
1955 55.83 193.44  28.86 
1960 429.49 142.80  300.76 
1965 317.25 156.07  203.27 
1970 479.95 182.95  262.34 
1975 718.98 96.63  744.05 
1980 875.48  284.45  307.78 
1985 1235.19 769.63  160.49 
1990 1944.68 992.42  195.95 
1995 2985.58 3256.62 91.68 
2000 6406.06 6989.17 91.66 
2004 11893.37 14503.10 82.01 
Source: CSYB: various issues 
* The local government’ revenue share is in the percentage of the central government 
revenue. 
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own. As Oi (1992, 1995) puts it, the local incentive was the key of China’s economic 
takeoff. Local governments were allowed to detain a bigger portion of tax income for 
their economic development.  Institutional reforms in 1980 set the tone for increasing 
local self-reliance in public finance. The reforms were motivated by a commitment to 
greater decentralization of decision-making, the need to shed expenditure responsibilities 
given reduced central fiscal resources, and the desire of central leaders to secure the 
political support of provincial officials by increasing local autonomy (Wong 1994). 
Therefore, the budgetary revenue share of the central government declined sharply in the 
late 1980s. 
The extra-budgetary revenue, however, is very unique in China’s economic 
development. It reflects the desire for flexibility that the Chinese government has been 
eagerly pursuing. Figure 4.20 shows the Chinese government’s extra-budgetary revenues 
from 1952 to 2004. Extra-budgetary revenue consists of tax surcharges and user fees 
levied by the central and local government’s agencies as well as earnings from SOEs. 
The extra-budgetary local revenues are not subject to sharing with the central government 
but the budgetary revenues are. Up to 1994, all budgetary revenues except custom’s 
duties were collected by local government.  
 In 1994, however, a new policy towards tax revenue was put into effect by the 
central government. The tax system is at the core of central-local relations. In the pre-
reform economy, resource allocation was directed by the central authority and 
expenditures on economic constructions were primarily shouldered by the central 
government. The central budget also accounted for all the costs of national defense and 
external expenditures. In contrast, local governments were assigned the responsibility for 
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managing social services and governmental administration. In the early 1980s, market 
reforms put into place the new fiscal system known for “eating from separate kitchens.” 
This new policy gave local governments, especially the provincial governments, the 
incentives to retain a relatively bigger portion of extra-budgetary revenues. Therefore, 
extra-budgetary revenues increased rapidly throughout the 1980s (see Figure 4.20). 
The 1994 tax reform, however, allocated a bigger portion of tax income to the 
central government. Figure 4.20 indicates that the extra-budgetary local revenue share 
plunged in the middle 1990s. Since 1995, the budgetary local revenue share accounts for 
about 50 percent of the total budgetary revenue (see Figure 2.19).  
The central government’s share of extra-budgetary revenue has decrease sharply 
since 1986. Table 4.5 suggests that the central government received 41.2 percent of the 
total extra-budgetary revenue in 1986. The share, however, continuously decreased in the 
following years. By 2003, the central government only received 8.3 percent of the extra-
budgetary revenue. 
When compiling both the budgetary and extra-budgetary revenues, it was found 
that the local revenue began to surpass the central revenue since 1958 (Figure 4.21). 
Between 1953 and 1994, the difference between local and central revenue grew 
continuously (Figure 4.22). The new tax policy adopted in 1994 caused a sharp decline in 
the local revenue. Figure 4.22 indicates that the local revenue plunged in 1994. However, 
central governments’ share of revenue has been consistently growing over time. This is a 
strong indicator for China’s fiscal decentralization. 
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Figure 4.20 Chinese Government’s Extra-budgetary Revenues (in million yuan) 
 
Source: CSYB, various issues. 
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Table 4.5 Chinese Government’s Budgetary and Extra-budgetary Revenue in Selected 
Years (in million yuan) 
Year Central Gov. Revenue 
Local Gov. 
Revenue 
Extra- 
Budgetary 
Revenue 
Central Gov. Share of 
Extra-Budgetary 
Revenue (%) 
1955 193.44 55.83 17.02 - 
1960 142.80 429.49 117.78 - 
1965 156.07 317.25 75.56 - 
1970 182.95 479.95 100.94 - 
1975 96.63 718.98 251.48 - 
1980 284.45 875.48 557.40 - 
1981 311.07 864.72 601.07 - 
1982 346.84 865.49 802.74 - 
1983 490.01 876.94 967.68 - 
1984 665.47 977.39 1188.48 - 
1985 769.63 1235.19 1530.03 - 
1986 778.42 1343.59 1737.31 41.2 
1987 736.29 1463.06 2028.80 40.8 
1988 774.76 1582.48 2360.77 38.4 
1989 822.52 1842.38 2658.83 40.3 
1990 992.42 1944.68 2708.64 39.6 
1991 938.25 2211.23 3243.30 42.6 
1992 979.51 2503.86 3854.92 44.3 
1993 957.51 3391.44 1432.54 17.2 
1994 2906.50 2311.60 1862.53 15.2 
1995 3256.62 2985.58 2406.50 13.2 
1996 3661.07 3746.92 3893.34 24.3 
1997 4226.92 4424.22 2826.00 5.1 
1998 4892.00 4983.95 3082.29 5.3 
1999 5849.21 5594.87 3385.17 6.8 
2000 6989.17 6406.06 3826.43 6.5 
2001 8582.74 7803.30 4300.00 8.1 
2002 10388.64 8515.00 4479.00 9.8 
2003 11865.27 9849.98 4566.80 8.3 
Source: CSYB, various issues. 
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Figure 4.21 Budgetary and Extra-budgetary Government Revenue, 1953-2003 (in million 
yuan) 
 
Source: CSYB, various issues. 
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Figure 4.22 The Difference Between Local Revenue and Central Revenue, 1953-2003 (in 
million yuan) 
 
Source: CSYB, various issues. 
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3. Conclusion 
 This chapter discusses the impacts that institutional changes have placed on the 
Chinese welfare state. The government has played an active role in welfare policy 
making. Before the market reforms, the central government determined the pace of 
economic development. Under the command economic system, the central government 
controlled material and fiscal resources. Social security and welfare schemes were by and 
large decided by the central government. The socialist ideology emphasizes the role of 
workers. Hence, protecting workers’ political and social rights is one of the supreme 
goals of socialist regimes. Socialist states tend to install comprehensive and generous 
welfare schemes that extend coverage to all the working population. The Chinese welfare 
state has been no exception. Due to the active role of state, the social security and welfare 
schemes introduced in the early 1950s did not even take into account the revenue 
shortage. Heavy financial burdens finally forced the central government to shift such 
welfare responsibilities as medical service and insurance to enterprises.  
 The economic reforms brought multiple institutional changes to Chinese society. 
The reforms began with the implementation of market mechanisms in the Lenin Stalinist 
system. The rural economy was radically restructured to spur peasants’ productive 
incentives. Because of their flexibility and efficiency, private firms gradually triumphed 
in the race with collective or state-owned enterprises. In the early 1980s, small businesses 
such as TVEs in rural areas and individual firms (geti hu) in cities gradually replaced 
SOEs in the service and retail sector. Market reforms were introduced in SOEs to 
promote productivity. Many welfare benefits previously enjoyed by workers at low or no 
costs were then made available only to a small portion of the working population and 
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even then usually associated with high costs. 
 Meanwhile, local governments gain more freedom in economic affairs. In the 
reform era, the fiscal system becomes more decentralized. Enterprises and local 
authorities gain the ability to detain a significant amount of profit or revenue. But 
relatively less government money was given to the provision of social security and 
welfare. Local governments have been actively involving in economic affairs since the 
market reforms were initiated. Since a higher priority was place on economic 
development, welfare programs suffered from a shortage of investment.  
 Although China has experienced rapid industrialization in the past few decades, 
the state’s welfare expenditure grows very slowly. Industrial employment and urban 
population have increased continuously. In Western countries on the other hand, welfare 
expenditures grew concomitantly during their rapid industrialization. The Chinese 
welfare state, however, did not develop through industrialization alone. In addition to 
industrialization, Chinese society has also been gradually urbanized. Hundreds of 
thousands of jobless peasants began to seek jobs in cities. A heavy urban population has 
always been associated with soaring welfare expenditure. In China’s case, however, 
welfare expenditure fails to keep pace with urbanization. In recent years, this has led to 
some serious consequences. Many urban people, most of them rural immigrants or 
floating peasant workers, do not have any access to any form of social security or 
welfare.  
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CHAPTER 5:   
Institutional Changes and Welfare Benefits: Hypotheses and Evidences 
 
Institutional changes have radically restructured Chinese economy and society. The well-
being of the Chinese people has also been directly influenced. In urban areas, many 
people formerly worked for state enterprises are laid off during enterprise reforms. These 
people are deprived of access to publicly financed welfare schemes. People who seek job 
in private sectors have voluntarily given up welfare benefits in exchange for high cash 
income. In rural areas, people have less control over their careers. Income from 
cultivating land can barely sustain their living. When seeking job in non-agricultural 
sectors, however, they receive no compensation or training. Rural people are moving to 
cities to seek job opportunities. Floating peasant workers become a new phenomenon in 
Chinese society.  
Economic reforms have been so far the most significant institutional changes that 
affect the Chinese welfare state. Other institutional changes, as discussed in previous 
chapters, have been closely related to economic reforms. For example, decentralization 
did not start until economic reforms were put in practice to encouraging local incentive. 
Enterprise reforms which restructured SOEs are part of the economic reforms. In this 
chapter, I will demonstrate the impacts that institutional changes have placed on the way 
Chinese people receive welfare benefits. Through the study of the micro perspectives13 of 
the Chinese welfare state, I will discuss how economic reforms have influenced the 
                                                 
13 In contrast to macro studies which are always conducted with statistical data, micro perspectives refer to 
the study based on survey, or data collected at individual or household level. 
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distribution of welfare benefits among Chinese individuals and households. Empirical 
evidences are used to testify the impacts of China’s multiple transitions on people’s well-
being as well as the welfare system.  
In Chapter IV I have demonstrated that four major factors have influenced 
China’s welfare spending. They are industrialization, SOE reforms, urbanization, and 
decentralization. The exploration of statistical data suggests that all of them have been 
negatively related to the central government’s expenditure on welfare. In this chapter, I 
will use data from 1988 and 1995 Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP) to further 
discover the impacts that these factors have placed on Chinese people’s welfare benefits. 
The multiple regression statistical method of ordinary least squares (OLS) is used 
to testify the arguments I have made in Chapter IV. The statistical method will eventually 
lead to the compilation of five multiple regression models. In four of them – Model I 
through Model IV – I test individually the institutional change variables: Industrialization, 
SOE reforms, Urbanization, and Decentralization. I discuss the statistical impacts of each 
variable in the respective regression model. Finally, in the full model I evaluate the joint 
impacts that these four institutional change variables have had on the Chinese welfare 
state and people’s well-being. 
 
1. Data  
This dissertation is conducted by empirically modeling welfare benefit using data 
from Chinese Household Income Projects (CHIP) 1988 (Griffin and Zhao) and 1995 
(Riskin, Zhao, and Li). The CHIP 1988 and 1995 were conducted to measure and 
estimate the income distribution in both rural and urban areas of the People’s Republic of 
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China. Both household and individual were units of analysis. Items investigated included 
the income of household or individual, welfare benefits provided by the state, work units, 
or collective funds, and all types and values of subsidies. Households also reported on 
their expenditures on food, housing, and medical services. 
Since this dissertation examines whether China’s transitions are a function of the 
welfare benefit discrepancy in the reform era, I limit my examination to individual and 
household income in the form of welfare benefit. The dependent variable reflects the 
welfare benefits in cash value received by citizens. Components of the welfare benefits 
are all calculated in cash at the current market value. To construct the dependent variable, 
I added each welfare benefit received by a person to achieve the total value in that year.  
The descriptive analyses are based on data collected at both individual and 
household levels. These data enable me to do meaningful comparisons of China’s rural 
and urban individuals and households in terms of welfare benefit. Since the data consist 
of measures from both 1988 and 1995, I can also examine the discrepancy of welfare 
benefit through time.  
The regression analyses (the models), however, are based solely on the 1995 
CHIP Urban Individual (CHIPUI) dataset. Due to the lack of required variables, the 1988 
CHIP dataset is not used in the regression analyses. The 1995 CHIPUI dataset is a subset 
of the 1995 CHIP data. It was collected at the urban individual level. The dataset 
comprises 21,698 urban individuals. Among the interviewed individuals, however, only 
13,135 cases are valid.    
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2. Descriptive Analyses 
2.1 Falling Welfare Coverage  
While in the 1960s and 1970s China performed well on welfare provision, in the 
1980s it faltered, and in the 1990s it slipped still further. China’s increasingly weak 
performance is argued to reflect system-wide weaknesses in the welfare regime (Liu 
2002). For example, the cost of health service has grown rapidly in recent years, deterring 
use of health services, and put households who do use services at financial risk (Jalan and 
Ravallion 1999). The rise in the cost of care has coincided with falling health insurance 
coverage. Health insurance has all but disappeared in rural areas, and is under good deal 
of strain in urban areas.  
In the pre-reform era, peasants working for people’s communes enjoyed a variety 
of collective welfare benefits (Bloom and Gu 1997). Economic reforms destroyed the 
financial and organizational channels through which rural people drew welfare benefits. 
The door of collective welfare funds14 was actually shut down to Chinese peasants. 
In1988, 98 percent of rural households received nothing from collective welfare funds 
(Table 5.1). Among the seventeen five-guarantees households, none reported receiving 
collective welfare benefits in 1988 (Table 5.2). 
The declining coverage of health insurance is one of the most dramatic welfare 
retrenches in China. Under China’s pre-reform planned economy, almost all citizens were 
covered by some form of health insurance. Agricultural workers were covered by the old 
RCMS, SOE workers were covered by the LIS, and civil servants and other government  
                                                 
14 Collective welfare funds are publicly financed and managed programs that provide regular, which are 
always basic or minimum, aids to needy households.  
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Table 5.1 Rural Households Received Collective Welfare in 1988 and 1995 (% of total) 
Welfare Benefits from Collective 
Welfare Fund (yuan) 1988 1995 
0 98.0 98.2 
1~100 1.0 0.8 
101~200 0.3 0.2 
201~300 0.2 0.2 
301~400 0.2 0.1 
401~500 0.1 0.1 
>500 0.3 0.4 
Mean (yuan) 4.64 10.98 
 N=10258 N=7998 
Source: CHIP 1988 & 1995 
 
 
 
Table 5.2 Rural Household Type and the Distribution of Collective Welfare in 1988 
Household type 
Receive 
Collective 
Welfare 
Do Not Receive 
Collective 
Welfare 
% Receive 
Collective Welfare 
Five-guarantees 
Household 
 
0 17 0 
Township or Village 
Cadre Household 
 
37 717 4.9 
Worker/employee 
Household 
 
9 453 1.9 
Household with 
Permanent Residence in A 
City or Town 
 
3 427 0.7 
Other 
 153 8347 1.8 
Total 202 9961 - 
Source: CHIP 1988 
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workers were covered by the GIS. There were some gaps in coverage. For example, not 
all urban welfare schemes covered dependents. But the gaps were relatively small. 
During the 1970s the RCMS covered an estimate 90 percent of the rural population. 
China’s near-universal coverage is thought to have been one critical reason for its 
spectacular success in improving health outcomes during the 1970s (Sidel 1993). 
China’s economic transitions from the 1980s onwards brought radical reductions 
in the health insurance coverage. The decollectivization of agriculture resulted in almost 
the total collapse of the RCMS. By 1993 less than ten percent of the rural population had 
health insurance (World Bank 2005b). Other welfare benefits were also scissored in the 
reform era. Table 5.3 suggests that in 1988 approximately 57.6 percent of rural workers 
in state sectors received a pension. By 1995 rural pensioners in state sectors dropped to 
55.6 percent. Dramatic declines also happened in rural collective and private sectors. 
From 1988 to 1995, pensioners in collective and private sectors dropped 15.1 and 3.7 
percent respectively. In urban areas, enterprise reforms laid off hundreds of thousand 
state employees. Their health insurance that previously financed by their work units were 
either completely revoked or left in poor condition. By 1995 more than forty percent of 
urban population paid health insurance premiums or medical costs out of their own 
pockets (Table 5.4). Only 51.3 percent of urban population was covered by public health 
services provided by the state or the work unit. 
 
2.2 Work Unit-Based Welfare Benefits  
In the pre-reform era, the majority of urban workers received welfare benefits 
from their work units. The work unit became one of the most referred approaches for the 
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Table 5.3 Rural Pensioners in Different Ownership Sectors, 1988 & 1995 (% of the 60+ 
population within the ownership sector) 
Ownership Sector 1988 1995 Difference 
State-owned enterprise or 
institution 
 
57.6 55.6 -2.0 
Collective 
 21.4 6.3 -15.1 
Private or individual 
enterprise 
 
3.7 0 -3.7 
Farming  2.5 0.1 -2.4 
Source: CHIP 1988 & 1995 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.4 Health Insurance in Urban Areas, 1995 
Health Insurance Type Frequency Percent 
Through Public Health 
Service Provided by State 
or the Work Unit 
 
11121 51.3 
Through Commercial 
Medical Insurance 
 
2221 10.2 
Entirely Self-financed 
 6530 30.1 
Other 
 1822 8.4 
Total 21694 100 
Source: CHIP 1995 
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research of the welfare state with the Chinese characteristics (Chan and Chow 1992). 
Welfare benefits provided by the work unit included health insurance, pension, maternity 
compensation, and industrial injury care and compensation. Hardship allowances and 
food subsidies were regular benefits associated with employment. Economic reforms 
introduced in the mid-1980s brought dramatic changes to the way state employees 
received welfare benefits from the state or the work unit.  
First, many state employees were laid off. Enterprise reforms were introduced in 
1984. SOEs were asked by the government to cutting loss-making or less profitable 
projects. Managers were given more autonomy to lay off “redundant workers.” In 1988 
state sectors employed only 22.2 percent of the total working population (Table 5.5). In 
1995 the workforce in state sectors further decreased to 18.9 percent. In contrast, the 
workforce in private and Sino-foreign joint enterprises grew twice and trice respectively.  
Secondly, SOEs made very limit progress on the welfare support for the most 
disadvantaged groups. SOE employees receiving hardship allowances in various kinds 
grew only 0.1 point from 1988 to 1995 (Table 5.6). Although hundreds of thousand 
employees were laid off to increase productivity, SOEs still failed to provide hardship 
subsidies to the needy employees. By contrast poor families in private sectors were given 
more welfare relief.  In 1995 1.9 percent of employees in private sectors were given 
hardship allowances. The increase was very impressive because private sectors accounted 
for only 1.1 percent of the total workforce. 
Thirdly, many employees in state sectors lost their medical care benefits during 
the SOE reforms. SOEs pursued profit at the cost of employees’ job security and welfare 
benefit. By 1995 only 58.9 percent of state employees reported receiving medical care
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Table 5.5 Ownership Sector of Primary Workplace for Urban Residents, 1988 and 1995 
(%) 
Ownership Sector of 
Workplace 1988 1995 
State-owned, at Center or 
Province (or autonomous 
region) or Municipality Level 
 22.2 18.9 
Collective 
 33.7 48.0 
Private or Individual-owned 
 0.6 1.1 
Sino-foreign Joint Venture 
 0.2 0.7 
Foreign-owned 0.03 0.1 
Source: CHIP 1988 & 1995. 
 
 
 
Table 5.6 Hardship Allowance in Different Ownership Sectors, 1988 & 1995 (%) 
Ownership Sector 1988 1995 Difference 
State-owned, at Center or 
Provincial (or autonomous region) 
or Municipal Level 
 0.6* 0.7 +0.1 
Collective 
 0.8 0.6 -0.2 
Private or Individual-owned 
 0.5 1.9 +1.4 
Sino-foreign Joint Venture 
 - - - 
Foreign-owned - - - 
Source: CHIP 1988 & 1995. 
* percents are calculated within each ownership category. 
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benefits from the state (Table 5.7). Under the planned economic system, however, health 
services were provided to virtually all urban workers free of charge (Wu 1997). 
Employees of private enterprises received less medical care benefits from the state. Only 
1.9 percent of investigated workers in private enterprises received medical care benefits 
in 1995. The medical benefit gaps between ownership sectors were huge.  
In Table 5.7, employees of state sectors received an average of 433 yuan medical 
subsidies from state while employees of private enterprises received only five yuan. 
Although state sectors had diminished welfare benefits to their employees, they were by 
1995 the best providers of medical care benefits. The Sino-foreign joint enterprise, a 
growing economic sector in China, was outstanding in welfare provision to the 
employees. In 1995 it provided the most generous medical care benefits in private sectors. 
About 34.5 percent of employees in Sino-foreign joint enterprises received medical care 
benefits. The average amount they received was 123 yuan, the highest in private sectors. 
 
3. Research Hypotheses 
In Chapter IV I have demonstrated that the Chinese welfare policy-making has 
been under tight control of the central government. Employees in state sectors receive 
better welfare coverage in contrast with those in private or collective sectors. Chinese 
social security schemes have been mostly created by the central government and financed 
by the general revenue or enterprise-retained profit. Such welfare benefits as housing 
allowances, child care subsidies, and unemployment compensations (available since 
1993), are partly or completely provided by work units. Urban people employed in state 
sectors are usually given the access to more welfare schemes. Subsidies they gain from
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Table 5.7 Urban Individuals from Different Ownership Sectors Receiving Medical Care 
Benefits from State in 1995 
Ownership sector Mean (yuan)* Percent (%)! N # 
State-owned at Central or 
Provincial Level 
 
433 58.9 4096 
Local Publicly-owned 
 385 54.3 8039 
Urban Collective 
 229 41.9 2394 
Township and Village 
Enterprise 
 
294 50.0 8 
Private Enterprise 
 5 1.9 53 
Self-employed 
Business/Individual 
Enterprise 
 
13 2.6 193 
Sino-foreign Joint Venture 
 123 34.5 145 
Foreign-owned 33 12.5 16 
Source: CHIP 1995. 
Note:  * mean values for each category. 
! the portion of investigated persons in each category that receive medical subsidies from 
state. 
# the number of persons investigated in each category. 
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work units are also higher in market value than those received by employees in non-state 
sectors. 
Previous sections of this chapter have discussed welfare benefit differences between 
the urban and rural population. Economic reforms from the 1980s onward have dramatically 
changed the way the Chinese people receive welfare benefits from the state. Rural people are 
the primary victims of economic reforms and the associated institutional transitions. The 
urban working population, however, have been influenced by economic reforms differently. 
First, many state employees still enjoy full welfare benefits. The laid-off workers, however, 
were denied of access to public welfare schemes, namely the LIS or GIS. They were 
unemployed or self-employed after being laid off from state sectors. Second, the rapid 
growth of private sectors, especially private enterprises and individual firms, provided a new 
career channel for urban residents. Employment in private sectors had expanded at an 
accelerative speed since enterprise reforms were widely introduced in SOEs. 
 
3.1 Variables and Coding  
In the regression models, the independent variable Place of Work (state or non-
state) is equivalent to SOE reforms.  I measure this variable by compiling whether a 
person is employed in non-state sectors. A person who is employed in non-state is coded 
as 1 and 0 for employees in state-owned organizations at central or provincial level.  
The independent variable Industry or Non-industry is equivalent to 
industrialization. This variable is measured by compiling whether a person is employed 
in such traditional industrial sectors as heavy or light industry, mining, construction, 
transportation, or commercial material supply. A person who is employed in these areas 
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is coded as 1 and 0 otherwise.  
In the regression models, Primary Income Source represents urbanization. The 
measure of Primary Income Source is complicated. It is the count of urban residents who 
draw primary income from agriculture sectors. Usually, urbanization means the size of 
urban population. The 1995 CHIPUI, however, does not directly report the rate of 
urbanization. An indirect measure is used to represent this variable. In the dataset, a 
variable measuring an individual’s economic sector of primary job can be used to 
compile the urbanization rate. Although a person lives in urban areas, his or her primary 
job may be in agricultural sectors. Welfare benefits for employees in agricultural sectors 
are different from those in non-agricultural sectors. Hence, an urban resident reports 
working in non-agricultural sectors is coded as 1 and 0 otherwise.  
The last independent variable Source for Welfare Benefit is equivalent to 
decentralization. This variable is measured by compiling whether a person receives health 
protection from state or public sources. A person whose health care is not covered by the 
state or the work unit at central or provincial level is coded as 1 and 0 otherwise. Since 
health care is one of the most important parts of welfare benefits available to the Chinese 
people, the examination of health care can reflect the situation of a person’s well-being. 
Receiving health care services from non-state or public sources reflects the institutional 
decentralization of the welfare benefit distribution.  
 
3.2 Welfare Benefit  
Research on the Chinese welfare state has taken the welfare benefits received by 
people as the most important object. In this dissertation, the market value of the welfare 
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benefits provided by state or the work unit is the sole dependent variable. As I have 
discussed in previous chapters, the government and the work unit monopolized welfare 
provision in the pre-reform era. Economic reforms radically changed the distribution of 
welfare benefits. In this study, the welfare benefit is measured with cash at market value. 
Three parts are included:  
1, state-paid medical care benefits;  
2, wages when “waiting for job”, or unemployment compensations;  
3, other allowances and subsidies: 
 a, housing subsidies 
 b, medical subsidies 
 c, child care subsidies 
 d, regional subsidies (benefits for people working in remote or poor areas) 
 
3.3 Place of work (state or non-state) 
This is the measure for the impacts of SOE reforms. Earlier research has indicated 
that economic reforms affect the welfare distribution and people’s welfare benefits 
(Wong 1992, 1998, Chen 2002). Moreover, existing research has established that work 
unit is an adequate channel in measuring the discrepancy of people’s welfare benefits 
(Chan and Chow 1992). Previous discussions in this study have revealed that the 
changing characteristics of the Chinese welfare state are associated with the multiple 
transitions started in the early 1980s (Li 2004). Accordingly, I expect that enterprise 
reforms, the most important part of the Chinese economic reforms in urban areas, will be 
a function of the welfare discrepancy between different ownership sectors. I hypothesize 
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that employees in non-state sectors receive less amount of welfare benefits from state or 
work unit than people employed in state sectors. Hence, 
 H1: A person who is employed in non-state sectors will be more likely to receive 
less welfare benefits from the state or the work unit than people who are employed in 
state sectors. 
 
 The testing of this hypothesis will lead me to find out the impacts that SOE 
reforms have placed on the distribution of welfare benefits among urban residents. In the 
pre-reform era, the welfare benefit distribution was very even in urban areas. A person 
employed in state sectors received the same package of social security and welfare 
benefits as people in collective sectors. However, the welfare benefit discrepancy began 
to grow in the reform era. Enterprise reforms laid off hundreds of thousand state 
employees. Some of the laid-off workers went to private sectors. Their welfare benefits 
previously provided by state sectors were either revoked or cut down. Employees in 
private sectors, however, are less likely to receive welfare benefits from the state. 
 
  3.4 Industry or Non-industry 
This is the measure for industrialization. The progress of industrialization has 
always been associated with the expansion of welfare states (Wilensky and Lebeaux 
1958, Kerr et al. 1960, Pryor 1968, Rimlinger 1971, Wilensky 1975). China’s rapid 
industrialization, however, did not go with the growth of welfare expenditure. Welfare 
benefits available to employees in industrial sectors did not improve in the reform era. 
People in other economic sectors might have received more welfare benefits than those in 
industrial sectors. Therefore, I expect that people employed in industrial sectors will 
receive less welfare benefits than employees in non-industrial sectors. Hence, 
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 H2: A person who is employed in industrial sectors will be more likely to receive 
less welfare benefits from the state or the work unit than people who are employed in 
non-industrial sectors. 
 
 
3.5 Primary Income Source (agriculture or non-agriculture)  
 This is the measure for urbanization. The increase of urban population led to the 
welfare state expansion in many industrialized societies. The growth of urban population and 
city areas has been closely associated with a heavier welfare responsibility for the state. But in 
the reform era, Chinese society has witnessed stagnant welfare expenditure during the rapid 
industrialization. Therefore, each urban resident receives a decreasing share of welfare benefits. 
To test the impact of urbanization on the welfare benefits, I compile employees in non-
agricultural sectors to represent the urban population while those living in urban but drawing 
income primarily from agricultural sectors are counted as the non-urban population. I assume 
that a person drawing income primarily from non-agricultural sectors is completely urbanized. I 
also assume that people employed in agricultural sectors are also economically associated with 
agriculture. Their welfare benefits, therefore, are more likely disbursed from agricultural 
sectors. I expect that people in non-agricultural sectors will receive less welfare benefits than 
those in agricultural sectors. Hence, 
 H3: A person who has been economically urbanized (employed in non-
agricultural sectors) is more likely to receive less welfare benefits from the state or the 
work unit than people who are economically associated with agriculture (employed in 
agricultural sectors and thus not completely urbanized). 
 
 
3.6 Source for Welfare Benefit (state or non-state) 
This is the measure for decentralization. Chinese society has been institutionally 
decentralized in the reform era. The central government has given up tight control over 
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many economic issues. Enterprises can retain a bigger portion of profit. Local 
governments have resumed many autonomous rights in economic development. As the 
result of the fiscal decentralization, the provision of the welfare benefit has accordingly 
been decentralized. To test the impact of decentralization on the distribution of the 
welfare benefit, I choose people who receive health care services from non-state or public 
sources to represent decentralization. Drawing welfare from local funds reflects the 
situation of decentralization. I expect that a person who draws from local funds receives 
less welfare benefits than those people who draw from state or public sources. Hence, 
H4: A person who draws from non-state or public welfare funds is more likely to 
receive less welfare benefits from the state or the work unit than people who draw from 
state or public welfare funds. 
 
 
 
3.7 Control Variables 
To test the institutional explanations of the distribution of welfare benefits 
rigorously, I must situate these hypotheses in a more general model of the welfare benefit 
distribution. Accordingly, I include a set of six additional variables as controls. Existing 
research suggests that a person’s welfare benefits are shaped by many background 
characteristics. I focus on certain basic background characteristics – age above 60 (60+) 
and education – that shape a person’s position in welfare treatment. The expectation of 
the welfare benefit discrepancy linked to age 60+ and education is based on the premise 
that the older or the more educational a person is the greater welfare benefits he or she 
will receive. A person’s age is at or above 60 is coded as 1 and 0 otherwise. A person’s 
educational level is coded by the years he or she has stayed in school. 
 Further, work experience is highly related to welfare benefits a person can receive. 
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The premise with the variables – total years of work experience and years in current work 
unit – is that the longer a person has been working for an institution the more welfare 
benefits he or she will receive. Another control variable I use in the models is the gross 
income a person earned in 1995. Since welfare benefits are always calculated with the 
gross income as the base value, a person’s gross income will determine the welfare 
benefits he or she can receive. Obviously, the more a person can earn the more welfare 
benefits he or she can receive. The last control variable is the measure of the nature of job. 
If one’s job is temporary, he or she will be more likely receive less welfare benefits since 
seasoning or temporary jobs are automatically excluded from many welfare schemes in 
China. Therefore, I expect that temporary job holders are more likely to receive less 
welfare benefits than permanent job holders. A person’s job is coded as 1 if it is 
temporary and 0 otherwise. 
 
4. Analytical Methods and Models 
 The full model of the analysis will be the regression of the dependent variable 
Welfare Benefit on the four institutional variables and all control variables. Since welfare 
benefits are measured by calculating cash values paid to individuals, the natural 
logarithm of the values will be more adequate. Gross income of 1995 is a control variable 
which also appears in the natural logarithmic form. Hence, the full model is: 
     Ln(Welfare Benefit) = a + X1 Place of Work + X2 Industry or Non-Industry 
                                             + X3 Primary Income Source + X4 Source for Welfare Benefit    
                                             + X5 Age + X6 Education + X7 Total Years Work Experience 
                                             + X8 Years at Current Work Unit + X9 Ln(Gross Income95)   
                                             + X10 Temporary Job 
   
To test the independent variable individually, I examine the dependent variable 
 144
Welfare Benefit on each of them separately. Four institutional variables to be examined 
are tested individually in each model. Therefore, model I through IV will be: 
      Ln(Welfare Benefit) = a + X1 (Place of Work / Industry or Non-Industry / 
                                               Primary Income Source / Source for Welfare Benefit)   
                                           + X2 Age + X3 Education + X4 Total Years Work Experience 
                                      + X5 Years at Current Work Unit + X6 Ln (Gross Income95) 
                                           + X7 Temporary Job 
 
 
5. Results and Analyses 
In Table 5.8 I test the expectations for institutional determinants of the welfare 
benefit distribution. The data are from the 1995 Chinese Household Income Project urban 
individual (CHIPUI) survey results. In addition to traditional factors linked to welfare 
benefit, my findings confirm the strong role of institutional variables such as SOE Reform 
and Decentralization in the distribution of welfare benefits. But I also find that the other 
two institutional variables Industrialization and Urbanization are not statistically 
significant. 
 Model I tests the expectation for the impacts Place of Work (state or non-state), 
the equivalent for SOE reforms, has placed on the distribution of welfare benefits. Do 
employees in non-state sectors receive less welfare benefits from the state or the work 
unit than those people that are employed in state sectors? The results suggest that 
independent variable Place of Work and the six control variables account for nearly a 
quarter of the variance in the distribution of welfare benefits. Including the independent 
variable, all seven explanations have significant estimates. 
 The independent variable Place of Work has a strong negative coefficient of 0.311 
and is statistically significant. This indicates that in 1995 SOE reforms did play an 
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Table 5.8  The Determinants of the Welfare Benefit Distribution 
Predictors Model I Model II 
Model 
III 
Model 
IV 
Full 
Model 
Expected 
Direction 
Place of Work 
(state or non-
state) 
 
-.311 ** 
(.046) - - - 
-.204** 
(.045) – 
Industry or Non-
industry 
 
- .003 (.042) - - 
-022 
(.041) – 
Primary Income 
Source 
(agriculture or 
non-agriculture) 
 
- - -.23 (.154) - 
-.121 
(.151) – 
Source for 
Welfare Benefit 
(state or non-
state) 
 
- - - -1.22** (.044) 
-1.2** 
(.045) – 
Control Variable       
Age 60+ -2.2 ** (.08) 
-2.17** 
(0.81) 
-2.17** 
(.081) 
-2.2** 
(.078) 
-2.22** 
(.079) + 
Education .121** (.007) 
.126** 
(.007) 
.126** 
(.007) 
.104** 
(.007) 
.1** 
(.007) + 
Years of Work 
Experience 
.017** 
(.003) 
.017** 
(.003) 
.017** 
(.003) 
.013** 
(.003) 
.013** 
(.003) + 
Years in Current 
Work Unit 
.01* 
(.003) 
.011** 
(.003) 
.011** 
(.003) 
.007* 
(.003) 
.007* 
(.003) + 
Ln (Gross 
Income in 1995) 
.871** 
(.0001) 
.971** 
(.025) 
.9711** 
(.025) 
.871** 
(.025) 
.863** 
(.025) + 
Temporary Job -1.95** (.128) 
-1.97** 
(.129) 
-1.968**
(.129) 
-1.59** 
(.126) 
-1.577** 
(.126) – 
Constant -4.1** (.209) 
-4.2** 
(.212) 
-3.97** 
(.26) 
-2.56** 
(.211) 
-2.368** 
(.259)  
Model Fit       
R2 .235 .232 .232 .276 .277  
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 2.307 2.311 2.311 2.245 2.243  
N 13,135 13,135 13,135 13,135 13,135  
Note: Entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients. Standardized errors are 
given in parentheses. 
** p<0.01, * p < 0.05 
 146
differences in ownership sector explain much of this variance. Together, measures for the  
important role in the distribution of welfare benefits among urban individuals. Basically, 
employees in non-state sectors received less welfare benefits from the state or the work 
unit than those people who were employed in state sectors. Therefore, the argument that 
SOE reforms have diminished urban employees’ welfare benefit is true. As I have 
discussed in Chapter IV and previous sections in this chapter, employees in state sector 
have decreased in share to merely 16 percent of total employed persons (see Figure 4.9).  
About 50 percent of urban residents have lost welfare benefits of various kinds. 
Employees in state sectors enjoy more welfare benefits than urban people in other 
ownership sectors. The welfare benefit discrepancy between ownership sectors, 
especially the state and non-state sectors, have grown rapidly as SOE reforms are widely 
implemented. Welfare benefit gaps between urban residents have been widened in the 
reform era. 
 In Model II and Model III I turn to analyzing the impacts of industrialization and 
urbanization. The variable Industry or Non-industry is the equivalent for industrialization 
and Primary Source of Income represents urbanization. The results suggest that the 
distribution of welfare benefits has not been associated with either industrialization or 
urbanization that has been consistently changing China. Contrary to my expectations, 
industrialization or urbanization does not have significant estimates.  
 Similar to Model I findings, Model IV suggests that decentralization has a very 
strong influence on the distribution of welfare benefits. In Model IV, the independent 
variable Source for Welfare Benefit represents decentralization. I found that a person’s 
welfare benefit decreased when he or she drew from local funds. Therefore, fiscal 
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decentralization has negatively influenced those employees who draw welfare benefits 
from non-state sources. This finding complies with the previous argument that 
decentralization has brought financial sources to local levels and diminished welfare 
benefits of those people associated with local funds. 
 In the Full Model, I put all four independent variables in one regression model. 
All independent variables are found negatively related to the dependent variable. The 
adjusted R2 (.277) and the standard error of the estimate (2.243) give us a sense of the 
model’s fit. The slight improvement of the R2 in the Full Model indicates that compiling 
four independent variables in one model does increase the model’s fit. Results suggest 
that Place of Work and Source for Welfare Benefit are significant while Industry or Non-
industry and Primary Income Source do not have significant estimates. These results 
confirm the findings from previous models. Two institutional change factors, namely 
SOE reforms and decentralization, have been tested significantly influencing Chinese 
urban people’s well-being.  
The results of the Full Model indicate that individuals working for non-state 
sectors receive less welfare benefits than employees in the state sector. This is what 
hypothesis number one (H1) articulates. Hence, laid-off workers during SOE reforms are 
the losers in terms of welfare benefits. Since hundreds of thousands of workers were laid 
off during the SOE reforms, the overall welfare provision for the urban population has 
correspondingly decreased in quality.  
Urban individuals drawing welfare benefits from local funds are found receiving 
less welfare support than people receiving welfare benefits from the state or central funds. 
Therefore, hypothesis number four (H4) is true. In the reform era, an important strategy 
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adopted by the Chinese government was the stimulation of local incentive. Local 
governments and enterprises were encouraged to achieve fiscal independence and self-
sustain. As a result, welfare funds previously controlled by the central government were 
decentralized during the market reforms. The proportion of urban people receiving 
welfare benefits from local funds increased while individuals drawing from state or 
central welfare funds decreased correspondingly (see Figure 4.9). Hence, urban people’s 
welfare benefits were diminished due to the decentralization. 
The two non-significant variables are Industry or Non-industry and Primary 
Income Source which represent industrialization and urbanization respectively. 
Hypotheses number two (H2) and three (H3) are thus not supported by neither the 
individual testing model nor the Full Model. These results strongly signal that 
industrialization and urbanization are not determinant factors for the welfare benefit 
discrepancy found among Chinese urban individuals.  
Although in the Full Model these two variables representing industrialization and 
urbanization still share with Place of Work and Source for Welfare Benefit the negative 
direction of impact towards the dependent variable, their estimates are not significant. I 
can only guess without any concrete support that urban people who work for non-
industrial sectors or who draw primary income from agricultural sectors (farming, fishing, 
etc.) might be placed in the disadvantageous situation in terms of welfare benefit. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 This chapter discusses the distribution of welfare benefits in rural and urban areas. 
Through the exploration of the data from Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP) 
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1988 and 1995, I found that institutional changes did influence the chance and amount 
people receive welfare benefits from the state or the work unit. Rural people were the 
primary victims of the economic reforms. In the pre-reform era, more than 90 percent of 
the rural population was covered by some kind of medical insurance that was financed by 
collective funds. Economic reforms dismantled the organizational and fiscal sources for 
rural welfare schemes. By the early 1990s, less than ten percent of the rural population 
was covered by a medical insurance. The measure of 1988 CHIP suggests that 98 percent 
of the rural households received nothing from collective welfare funds. Some poorest 
households, for example the five-guarantees households which were the primary targets 
of the social relief in the pre-reform era, were completely ignored by the government. 
Obviously, welfare provision in Chinese countryside was shrinking in coverage and 
quality. 
 The welfare provision for urban residents was diversified. On one hand, 
employees in the state sector still enjoyed full welfare coverage. State or publicly funded 
welfare schemes provided various kinds of welfare benefits to employees in the state 
sector. On the other hand, non-state employees lost welfare privileges they enjoyed in the 
pre-reform era. Evidences from multiple regressions suggest that SOE reforms and the 
decentralization played a significant role in the welfare benefit downsizing in the reform 
era. They both negatively influenced the distribution of welfare benefits. Basically, 
employees in non-state sectors and drawing welfare benefits from local funds are more 
likely to receive less welfare benefits from the work unit. The other two institutional 
changes, industrialization and urbanization, are found not statistically significant.  
 These findings confirmed the conclusion made in Chapter IV. The Chinese 
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welfare state still biases again rural people. Employees in the state sector receive more 
welfare benefits than people in other ownership sectors. Institutional decentralization 
enables local governments and enterprises to possess relatively bigger share of resources 
and more autonomous rights in the economic field. However, few resources have been 
used to promote people’s well-being. Therefore, people associated with local welfare 
funds are found worse off in the reform era. Industrialization and urbanization have non-
significant estimates in the regression. Descriptive analyses indication that quite contrary 
to what happened in Western industrial societies, the Chinese industrialization and 
urbanization did not bring more welfare to the people. This is not surprised since the 
economistic state orientation determines that the Chinese government regards economic 
development as its highest goal. The cost, therefore, is people’s well-being. 
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CHAPTER 6: Conclusion 
 
 China is undertaking a major revamping of its social security and welfare system. 
Reforms of its social policies are at the crossroads and many challenges are to be seen. 
The multiple transitions since the early 1980s have dismantled a system of enterprise 
welfare (welfare distributed primarily by work units). A new welfare system based on 
market is replacing the old work unit-based welfare system under the planned economy. 
China is the most populous country with a large rural population. Its newly established 
market economy is still weak and the gaps between regions are widening. These 
demographic and economic factors determine that the Chinese government will not 
resolve the welfare benefit discrepancy in the foreseeable future. 
 This dissertation has two interlinked purposes: to describe and discuss China’s 
multiple transitions and the institutional performance, and to examine empirically how 
these transitions have influenced the Chinese social security and welfare system and 
people’s well being.  This dissertation has deliberately discussed the development of the 
Chinese welfare state since the establishment of the Communist regime. It demonstrates 
the differences between the welfare provision in ancient China and the modern welfare 
schemes created and maintained by the Communist government. The CCP laid down the 
ground for the modern welfare state in the early years of the PRC. Comprehensive and 
generous welfare schemes covering almost every aspect of people’s welfare needs were 
installed as early as in 1951. In the pre-reform era, the Chinese government provided full-
fledged welfare schemes to the majority of urban residents. Rural people were also 
covered by some welfare programs funded by collectives or the local government. The 
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Chinese government adopted a “low wage high welfare benefit” policy in its socialist 
construction and consolidation period (Chow 1987, Chen 2003). This policy encouraged 
full employment and as a result led China to an egalitarian society (Chan and Chow 
1992). 
 Economic reforms initiated in the early 1980s, however, have dramatically 
changed the Chinese welfare state. Many welfare schemes originally financed by the 
government’s general revenue or the enterprise profit were revoked or cut back. The 
government began to promote economic growth at the cost of people’s job security and 
welfare benefit. China’s fiscal system was decentralized. Local governments and 
enterprises were given more autonomy in deciding economic issues. As a result, centrally 
financed welfare schemes were gradually moved to local levels. In the reform era, the 
near-universal coverage which is thought to have been an important reason for China’s 
spectacular success in improving health outcomes during the 1970s has since been in dim 
condition (Sidel 1993). 
In urban areas, hundreds of thousands of state employees were laid off due to the 
enterprise reforms which established the promotion of productivity the highest goal. 
Welfare benefits these former state employees enjoyed were either cancelled or moved to 
institutions at local levels where financial resources are scarce. Only in recent years, new 
welfare schemes were installed to protect low-income urban residents. For example, the 
Minimum Living Standard security system (MLS) was enforced to give welfare relief to 
the poorest urbanities who were always jobless. In rural areas, people could no longer 
draw welfare benefits from collective funds since the collapse of the people’s communes. 
The old Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme (RCMS) was almost completely disappeared 
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in rural areas. Although the government adopted a plan in 2003 to establish a new RCMS 
in some affluent rural areas, the achievement was undecided. 
This dissertation introduces an institutional approach for the research of the 
Chinese welfare state and the measure of the Chinese people’s welfare benefit. Earlier 
research suggests that China’s economic reforms have influenced social and welfare 
policies and consequentially people’s well-being (Wong 1992, 1998, Chen 2002). This 
dissertation demonstrates that multiple institutional transitions due to the economic 
reforms initiated in the early 1980s have since dramatically changed the Chinese welfare 
state and the way welfare benefits are distributed.  
Multiple institutional transitions discussed in this dissertation are structural 
changes associated with the SOE reforms, the rapid industrialization, ever-growing 
urbanization, and large-scale decentralization of the fiscal system since the early 1980s. 
These institutional transitions have influenced the Chinese welfare state and people’s 
well-being in different ways. Descriptive analyses in Chapter IV and Chapter V revealed 
that institutional transitions have by and large led China into a more polarized society. 
Basically, employees in the state sector are still covered by social security and welfare 
schemes of various kinds. Those SOE laid-off workers and urban individuals in non-state 
sectors, however, are less lucky. They were either completely removed from publicly 
funded welfare schemes or given only limited access to some minor relief programs. 
China’s industrialization did not show a linear growth in its progress. It had been 
discontinuous until the market reforms were initiated in the early 1980s (see Figure 4.12). 
The growth of the industrial output and industrial workforce has since increased 
consistently, which eventually placed more pressure on the Chinese government. In 
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contrast to the general connection between economic prosperity and growing welfare 
spending, China’ ever-growing modernization towards an industrial society since the 
1980s did not led to the growth of social security and welfare expenditure.  
The exploration of China’s statistical data gives us one more interesting finding: 
When Chinese society became more urbanized over time, the government did not 
increase its welfare spending proportionally. In the reform era, the central government’s 
welfare expenditure remained stagnant at approximately two percent of its total 
expenditure (see Table 4.2) whereas the rate for industrialization and urbanization were 
consistently growing (see Figure 4.12 & 4.17).  
The decentralization of China’s fiscal system and economic institutions further 
polarized the Chinese welfare system. A series of fiscal decentralization measures 
adopted by the Chinese government in the early 1980s have since decreased the revenue 
share of the center significantly.  
In order to test the impacts these institutional variables have placed on the 
distribution of welfare benefits, I designed five multiple regression models using the data 
from the 1995 Chinese Household Income Project Urban Individual data (CHIPUI). The 
collection for urban individuals which includes 21,698 cases was used for the regression 
models. After removing invalid and missing values, 13,135 cases were actually reported 
in the regression models. The findings confirmed that two institutional changes – SOE 
reforms and decentralization – played significant roles in the welfare benefit distribution 
among urban individuals. The other two institutional changes, namely industrialization 
and urbanization, did not have significant estimates. All four variables had negative 
relations towards the welfare benefits received by Chinese urban individuals. Results 
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suggest that SOE reforms and the decentralization of the Chinese fiscal system have 
diminished urban people’s welfare benefits in the reform era.  
The regression results indicate that China’s multiple transitions since the early 
1980s have radically changed the Chinese welfare state and the way people receiving 
welfare benefits. The market reforms have brought visible institutional changes into 
Chinese society. The centrally planned economy has gradually been replaced by a market 
economy. As a result, the Chinese polity has become more fragmented. Local 
governments received more autonomy in economic development. The emergence of a 
civil society enabled ordinary people to gain more freedom as well as to shoulder more 
responsibility, particular the self-sustaining obligation.  
The radical fluctuation of the welfare expenditure has been results of political 
leaders’ conscious policy choices. As discussed in Chapter II, the Chinese government 
played an active role in the development of the welfare system. The creation of a full-
fledged welfare system in the very early years of the PRC was a conscious choice of the 
Chinese leadership at that time. In the early 1950s, the newly establish Communist 
regime relied primarily on the support of the working class. The CCP was very aware of 
threats from the internal and external enemies. Therefore, the government financed a 
comprehensive welfare system in order to build a coalition of the proletarian to fight 
against the overthrown capitalists and feudal landlords.  
In the reform era, the Chinese leadership began to focus its attention on economic 
growth and the improvement of living standard. The obvious reason for rural reforms, for 
example, was to seek the security of food production which was severely undermined by 
the extreme leftist line in the Great Cultural Revolution (Oi 1996, 1999, Yao 1999). The 
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introduction of the market mechanisms in China’s rural economy was also a conscious 
choice of the political leaders, particularly Deng Xiaoping. In the early 1980s, Deng 
urged his party to abandon the planned economic system. He emphasized that a planned 
economy is not the definition of socialism (Gittings 2005). Deng stressed the primacy of 
agricultural output and encouraged a significant decentralization of decision making in 
the rural economy teams and individual peasant households. The creation of the 
Household Productive Responsibility System (HPRS) was one of Deng’s conscious 
policy choices towards the rural economic reforms which thereafter depleted collective 
welfare funds and rendered the collapse of the RCMS. 
Under the leadership of Jiang Zemin, China’s substantial economic growth 
rocketed. Throughout the 1990s, the CCP considered the well-executed reforms of SOEs 
as the top national priority and of vital importance in building a health socialist market 
economy. By 1997 the Chinese government enforced its policy of zhua da fang xiao 
(seizing the bigs and releasing the smalls) as the means to reform the SOEs. A 
shareholding system was claimed to be the reform’s major policy tool. As a result of this 
policy choice, hundreds of millions of SOE employees were laid off and denied of access 
to state-funded welfare schemes. 
The Hu Jintao administration, however, altered the route on the social policy to 
achieve a harmonious society. In recent speech President Hu announced that the 
country’s new political goal was to construct a harmonious society (People’s Daily Oct. 
20 2006). Former Premier Zhu Rongji, in office in 1998-2003, expressed to media in 
2000 that the building of a comprehensive social security system is a crucial issue for 
China’s reform, development and stability (People’s Daily Dec. 14, 2000). In his 2007 
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government work report, current Premier Wen Jiabao pledges that the government will 
promote a new rural cooperative medical sytem (RCMS). The new generation of Chinese 
leaders wants to construct a harmonious society. With this in mind, the government has 
made the restoration of a variety of social security programs and welfare schemes a 
priority on its agenda and budget plans. 
The Chinese government has recently taken efforts to improve its shabby welfare 
system. With the implementation of the Tenth Five-Year Plan, China’s labor and social 
security buildup was announced entering a new phase of development. During the early 
stage of the twenty-first century, these efforts face both pressures from fiscal constrains 
and continuous market reforms. Obviously, the overall progress of the reforms and the 
opening-up and modernization drive have created favorable conditions for solving the 
problems of employment and social security. The further growth of the national economy 
and the increase of productivity will provide a firm material foundation for the 
improvement of people’s well-being.  
Ever since the market-oriented employment mechanism was installed, the Chinese 
social security and welfare system has been facing both opportunities and challenges. On 
one hand, the market reforms and rapid economic growth have laid a sound ground for 
further promotion of the social security and welfare system. On the other hand, the 
Chinese government shall be prepared that the social security problem in both the rural 
and urban areas will remain sharp, and structural unemployment will become more 
serious for a long period.  
Despite marked progress in recent years, the social security and welfare system in 
China is still confronted with many challenges. For example, extension of coverage 
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remains a major task for various social insurance schemes. Social relief programs need to 
be further improved to provide protection for disadvantaged people. The upgrading of the 
Chinese economy threw heavy demand on structural changes. Millions of workers are 
expected to be retrenched due to foreign competition and industry upgrading pressure. In 
the long run, China has to resolve a series of social and economic issues brought about by 
the rapid aging of its vast population.  
Policies and measures for the Chinese government to conduct in the near future 
are various. First, the government is demanded to carry out an active policy for 
promoting employment. Therefore, tertiary industry, small and medium businesses, and 
non-state sectors shall be taken as the main channels for employment. Second, the central 
government shall promote reforms on the wage and income distribution system. The 
minimum wage system as well as the “equal pay for equal work” principle shall be 
upheld and improved to cover the majority of urban population and permanent peasant 
workers. Efforts shall be made to continue the pilot programs for the collective wage 
consultation system which were recently put into practice in a few coastal cities. Third, 
China has made a very good start in laying the foundation for a more stable old-age 
pension system. The new pension program shall include multiple pillars. Current pension 
programs do not encourage individual savings and the gap between different ownership 
sectors are growing. The financing burden of social security programs shall be borne by 
the individual, the work unit, and the government. A reasonable share of burden is to be 
worked out.  
The substantial changes of the Chinese social security and welfare system suggest 
that the underlying driving force for social policy reforms has been the broader effort to 
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stimulate economic growth and efficiency. The economistic state orientation has led the 
Chinese leaders to pursue economic growth at the cost of people’s welfare. The 
government has noted the unexpected impacts due to the absence of a sound social 
security and welfare system. Recently, it has taken a bigger and more direct role in social 
benefit provision. The government also takes the responsibility of providing a safety net 
for the urban poor through public assistance and relief programs. But the widening 
income gap between social groups, the foreseeable large-scale unemployment, and the 
absence of a democratic system will rather render a more polarized society. In recent 
years, the number of protest events involving large amount of peasants and peasant 
workers has been growing at a surprising rate. This is a very strong sign of social 
inequality. If the government fails to rebuild a sound welfare system extending its 
coverage to more disadvantaged population, the future of Chinese society will be rather 
dim.  
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Timelines of China’s Welfare Program Reforms Since 1980 
 
Program Urban areas Year of  reform Rural areas 
Year of 
reform 
Old-age pension: the 
reform was introduced 
in 1984. In 1997, a 
formal Decision on 
Establishing a Uniform 
Basic Old-Age 
Insurance System for 
Enterprise Employees 
was promulgated. 
 
1984 1. Five guarantees: old-
aged or disabled with 
no close relative to rely 
on can receive monthly 
or annual payment 
from the government or 
the village community. 
2. Retired cadres: 
depending on the rank, 
a retired cadre can 
receive various pension 
payments or subsidies. 
Early 
1980s 
Unemployment 
insurance: the 
government set up an 
unemployment 
insurance system in 
1986 to assist the rapid 
reforms in state-owned 
enterprises. In 1999, 
the government 
adopted the 
Regulations on 
Unemployment 
Insurance. 
 
1986 Social insurance for 
peasant at developed 
areas such as 
Guangdong and 
Shanghai. 
1987 
Social 
security 
Medical insurance: the 
reform was initiated in 
1988 in response to the 
unfitted free medicare 
system. In 1998, the 
government issued the 
Decision on 
Establishing the Basic 
Medical Insurance 
System for Urban 
Emeployees. 
 
1988 Rural Cooperative 
Medical System 
2006 
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Program Urban areas Year of  reform Rural areas 
Year of 
reform 
Industrial injury 
insurance: the 
government first 
introduced a set of 
reforms on this 
program in the late 
1980s. In 1996, the 
Trial Procedures for 
Industrial Injury 
Insurance for 
Enterprise Employees 
was issued. 
 
Late 
1980 
  
 
 
 
Child birth insurance: 
the reform was first 
made in some 
enterprises in 1988. 
The Trial Procedures 
for Childbirth 
Insurance for 
Enterprise Employees 
was formally issued in 
1994 
 
1988   
Two guarantees and 
three lines of 
protections 
 
1998   
Two guarantees and 
three lines of 
protection: a policy 
ensures that laid-offs 
from SOEs can receive 
basic living allowances.
1998 Relief for “hardship” 
household 
1987 Social 
welfare 
and relief 
Minimum living 
standard 
1999 Minimum living 
standard 
2006 
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